PLJ 2024 Lahore 607
Present: Sardar Muhammad Sarfraz Dogar, J.
GHULAM SARWAR--Petitioner
versus
EX-OFFICIO JUSTICE OF PEACE etc.--Respondents
W.P. No. 39257 of 2021, heard on 16.11.2022.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----Ss. 22-A & 22-B--Dismissal of petition for registration of FIR--Concealment of facts--Police report--Ulterior motive--No supportive evidence in favour of petitioner--False allegation--Witness of occurrence was on judicial remand on date of occurrence--It was evident from record that petitioner had concealed material facts in his application and if report was not summoned from local Police, registration of case on simple application of petitioner may causes harassment to innocent persons and would also be abuse of process of law--The cited witness of occurrence thus, it could not be possible for him to witness occurrence as such from face of it chances of false registration of case with ulterior motives could not be ruled out--The police did not get any supportive evidence in favour of petitioner as such JOP had rightly refused to issue direction to SHO concerned to register case against respondent--Ex-officio Justice of Peace had no other option except to consider report and parawise comments furnished by SHO concerned as narration of application under Section 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. also revealed a false and baseless allegation--Report and parawise comments furnished by police could not be brushed aside if requisitioned by trial Court--Petition dismissed. [Pp. 617 & 618] D, E, F & G
2013 PCr.LJ 684, 2021 SCMR 468, 2014 PCr.LJ 1146 &
PLD 2005 Lahore 470 ref.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 154--Information in cognizable offence--If there is an information relating to commission of a cognizable offence, it falls under Section 154 of Code of Criminal Procedure. [P. 611] A
PLD 2005 Lahore 470 ref.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 154--Duty of SHO--Provisions of Section 154, Cr.P.C. are quite explicit and duty of officer in charge of local Police Station in that regard is mandatory in nature. [P. 611] B
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 22-A(6)--Discretion of justice of peace--The provisions of Section 22-A (6), Cr.P.C. do not make it obligatory for an ex-officio Justice of Peace to necessarily or blind-foldedly issue a direction regarding registration of a criminal case whenever a complaint is filed before him in that regard as such Justice of Peace is still left with discretion to pass an order for registration of FIR that’s too in appropriate/certain cases. [P. 613] C
PLD 2005 Lahore 470.
Ch. Khursheed Anwar Bhinder, Advocate for Petitioner.
Mr. Shahzad Saleem Warriach, Advocate and Mian Muhammad Salman Idrees, Advocate for Respondent No. 3.
Mr. Muhammad Ajmal Adil, AAG for State.
Date of hearing: 16.11.2022.
Judgment
By means of this Constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner Ghulam Sarwar impugns the order dated 22.12.2020 passed by the learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace Ferozewala, whereby an application filed by the petitioner under Sections 22-A, 22-B, Cr.P.C. seeking registration of criminal case against private respondents has been dismissed.
2. The genesis of the controversy as narrated in the application moved by the petitioner under Sections 22-A & 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter to be referred as “Cr.P.C.”) before Respondent No. 1 (Ex-Officio Justice of Peace Ferozewala District Sheikhupura) stating therein that on 28.2.2020 at 7.00 p.m. at the behest of Muhammad Moeen Chishti, Respondent No. 3, one Wajid s/o unknown armed with pistol, Ahmed s/o unknown armed with pump action, both employees of Respondent No. 3 and Moazam s/o unknown alongwith six other unknown persons armed with firearm weapons forcefully entered into the farm house of the petitioner and on gunpoint took away 15 buffalos after loading in two trucks. The accused also entered in the residential room of the petitioner and after breaking box of the petitioner took away 10 tolas of gold ornaments, clothes, one A.C. and one refrigerator after loading on trucks. Besides, the petitioner, the occurrence was witnessed by Ali Shamsher and Sadaqat. The petitioner had been demanding for return of his articles and cattle and the accused promised to return the same but subsequently refused to do so. The occurrence was reported by the petitioner to SHO Factory Area, District Sheikhupura, through online written complaint bearing No. 9077-2020/5/11-FA, dated 5.11.2020, but no action whatsoever was taken, whereupon the petitioner was constrained to file an application under Sections 22-A, 22-B, Cr.P.C. which was dismissed through the impugned order dated 22.12.2020. Hence, this petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that it is the mandatory duty of the police officer u/S. 154, Cr.P.C. to register FIR on the complaint of the complainant and then to enquire into the matter by summoning the parties, record their statements u/S. 161, Cr.P.C. and to collect evidence and on the basis of such exercise, he has to decide about the guilt or the innocence of the accused persons and if the information or report submitted by the complainant is found false, then he can be proceeded u/S. 182, PPC but in the instant case no case on the complaint of the petitioner has been registered rather the matter was investigated without registering the case which is not mandated by the law. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the proposed accused does not have the right to be heard by the JOP when he deals with an application seeking registration of a case but in the instant case he heard the accused party which amounts to hearing the full-fledged case as the judicial Court, whereas JOP is mandated by law to act as a administrative forum and to take decision on the application of the complainant after hearing the complainant and perusing the police report, therefore, the JOP had acted beyond his power mandated by the law and as such the order passed by him being illegal is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that the JOP has to form an opinion about the offence being cognizable or non-cognizable from the facts narrated to him by the complainant orally or in writing and for such purpose he is not required to issue notice to accused or to police officer or to anybody else. It is also contended that the JOP has no judicial powers or judicial functions to perform under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. and all his powers and functions are administrative and ministerial in nature. It is next contended that whether the application was moved with mala fide intention or bona fide intention could only be proved after recording statement of the complainant by the police. He further contends that police report could not be considered as a sole criterion for passing the order by the JOP and the learned JOP while calling report from the police has committed illegality which is against the mandate of law. Further contends that an inquiry cannot be conducted by the police before the registration of the case as the same is alien to the criminal jurisprudence. It is also contended that the jurisdiction of JOP was to see as to why the police officials who were duty bound to record the statement under Section 154, Cr.P.C. have refused to fulfil their duty. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contentions has relied upon “Khizer Hayat and others vs. Inspector-General of Police (Punjab) Lahore and others” (PLD 2005 Lahore 470), “Muhammad Ali v. Additional I.G., Faisalabad and others” (PLD 2014 SC 753), “Mst. Bhaitan vs. The State and 3 others” (PLD 2005 Karachi 621), “Rab Nawaz vs. S.H.O. Police Station, Daharki and 4 others” (2012 MLD 736), “Pir Abdul Qayyum Shah vs. S.H.O. and 4 others” (2005 P.Cr.L.J. 357)[Lahore], “Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara Cantt and others ” (PLD 2007 SC 539), “Brig. (Retd) Imtiaz Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Interior Division, Islamaba d and 2 others” (1994 SCMR 2142).
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for Respondent No. 3 and the learned Law Officer while opposing this petition have supported the impugned order of the learned Justice of Peace and they both have unanimously contended that the impugned order was passed lawfully which does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect and while referring the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Younas Abbas and others v. Additional Sessions Judge, Chakwal and others (PLD 2016 SC 581) and this Court in Abid Ali alias Imran and another v. City Police Officer, Faisalabad and 6 others (PLD 2021 Lahore 274), mandates that where the Officer In-Charge of a Police Station refuses to register FIR the aggrieved person must approach to the superior officers in the hierarchy before making an application under Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. to the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace (“JOP”). In the present case the petitioner moved Respondent No. 1 directly so that application was not competent. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondent while relying upon “Jamal Khan versus Secretary Home Department” (2021 SCMR 468), contended that the report submitted by the police does not support the petitioner’s claim, therefore, the learned JOP has very rightly refused to issue direction to the SHO concerned, therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed on this score also.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the impugned order with their able assistance.
6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the case laws cited by the learned counsel for the parties, in order to resolve the controversy in the instant case, to my mind the following questions are necessitated to be dilated upon:-
(i) If there is an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, where such information is reported and under what provision of law?
(ii) where an aggrieved person could seek remedy against the Officer In-charge of a police station who refused registration of FIR?
(iii) whether the provisions of Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. make it obligatory for an ex-officio Justice of the Peace to necessarily or blind-foldedly issue a direction regarding registration of a criminal case whenever a complaint is filed before him in that regard?
(iv) what is the nature of functions which the JOP performs and as to whether the same are executive, administrative, ministerial or quasi-judicial? and
(v) how the JOP should decide the applications under Section 22-A (6), Cr.P.C. while exercising his powers under quasi-judicial? I
7. To start and to understand the criminal justice system with regard to registration of criminal case, the first point for elucidation is that if a person is aggrieved by the commission of cognizable offence, where and before whom such information is provided? To answer this basic question, it is observed that if there is an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, it falls under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which for the sake of ready reference is reproduced as under:-
“Section 154, Cr.P.C. Information in cognizable cases.
Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence if given orally to an officer incharge of a police station, shall be reduced into writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant, and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the Provincial Government may prescribe in this behalf.”
From the perusal of above, there is no gainsaying the fact that the provisions of Section 154, Cr.P.C. are quite explicit and the duty of the officer in charge of the local Police Station in that regard is mandatory in nature. Reliance is placed on “Khizer Hayat and others vs. Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others” (PLD 2005 Lahore 470). As such a police officer is bound to receive a complaint when it is preferred to him or where the commission of an offence is reported to him orally, he is under statutory obligation to enter it in the prescribed register, but the condition precedent is simply twofold: first, it must be an information and, secondly, it must relate to a cognizable offence on the face of it and not merely in the light of subsequent events. Guidance is sought from “Saeed Ahmad and others v. Naseer Ahmad and others” (PLD 2000 Lahore 208), & “M. Anwar Barrister-at-law v. The Station House Officer, Civil Lines Police Station, Lahore, and another” (PLD 1972 Lahore 493). The relevant excerpt is reproduced as under:
“If there is an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, it falls under Section 154, of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a police officer is under a statutory obligation to enter it in the prescribed register. The condition precedent is simply two-fold; first, it must be an information and, secondly, it must relate to a cognizable offence on the face of it and not merely in the light of subsequent events.”
8. Now, the question arises, where an aggrieved person could seek remedy against the Officer In-charge of a police station who refuses registration of FIR? On 21.11.2002, the Criminal Procedure (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 (Federal Ordinance No. CXXXI of 2002), added sub-section (6) in Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. and conferred additional powers on the Ex-officio Justices of Peace in respect of entertaining complaints and issuance of appropriate directions to the police authorities concerned regarding registration of criminal cases, transfer of investigation of criminal cases and in respect of neglect, failure or excess committed by a police authority in relation to its functions and duties. The said provision reads as under:-
“Section 22-A(6). An ex-officio Justice of the Peace may issue appropriate directions to the police authorities concerned on a complaint regarding:-
(i) Non-registration of criminal case;
(ii) Transfer of investigation from one police officer to another; and
(iii) Neglect, failure or excess committed by a police authority in relation to its functions and duties.”]
(emphasis provided)
Section 25, Cr.P.C. defines Ex-officio Justice of Peace as follows:
25. Ex-officio Justice of the Peace:-By virtue of their respective offices, the Sessions Judges and on nomination by them, the Additional Sessions Judges, are Justices of the Peace within and for whole of the District of the Province in which they are serving.
It was the intention of the legislature that if there is a genuine grievance on the part of an individual against the police and most particularly with reference to non-registration of FIR, he will resort to the concerned Justice of Peace i.e. Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge in a District for the redressal of his grievance and the concerned JOP would pass an appropriate order by keeping in view the fact and circumstance of the case. As such with insertion of clause (i) of Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. created a new forum where an aggrieved person could seek remedy against the Officer In-charge of a police station who refused registration of FIR.
9. Now come to the third question framed above, as to whether the provisions of Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. make it obligatory for an ex-officio Justice of the Peace to necessarily or blind-foldedly issue a direction regarding registration of a criminal case whenever a complaint is filed before him in that regard? In this context, it has been noticed that in Section 154, Cr.P.C. the word “sh all” has been used while in Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. the word “ma y” has been used, which manifests the intention of the legislature that the officer in charge of the relevant Police Station may be under a statutory obligation to register an FIR whenever information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence is provided to him but the provisions of Section 22-A (6), Cr.P.C. do not make it obligatory for an ex-officio Justice of the Peace to necessarily or blind-foldedly issue a direction regarding registration of a criminal case whenever a complaint is filed before him in that regard as such the Justice of Peace is still left with discretion to pass an order for the registration of FIR that’s too in appropriate/certain cases. Guidance is sought from the authoritative judgment of learned Full Bench of this Court in a case reported as “Khizer Hayat and others v. Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others” (PLD 2005 Lahore 470), wherein the learned Full Bench of this Court while dilating upon this issue was pleased to observe as under:
“As regards the complaints regarding failure of the police to register a criminal case despite commission of a cognizable offence having been reported to it there is no gainsaying the fact that the provisions of Section 154, Cr.P.C. in that respect are quite explicit and the duty of the officer in charge of the local Police Station in that regard is mandatory in nature. However, the officer in charge of the relevant Police Station may be under a statutory obligation to register an FIR whenever information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence is provided to him but the provisions of Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. do not make it obligatory for an ex-officio Justice of the Peace to necessarily or blind-foldedly issue a direction regarding registration of a criminal case whenever a complaint is filed before him in that regard. The use of the word “may” in Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. clearly shows that the jurisdiction of an ex-officio Justice of the Peace in that regard is discretionary in nature and understandably so.”
Even otherwise, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon the case of “Muhammad Bashir vs. Station House Officer, Okara Cantt and others” (PLD 2007 Supreme Court 539), that the jurisdiction of the JOP is limited to the examination of the complaint/information laid before him and he should right away direct the Officer In-charge of police station to register FIR if it discloses commission of a cognizable offence being overruled by the judgment of the larger Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as “Younas Abbas and others vs. Additional Sessions Judge, Chakwal and others” (PLD 2016 SC 581), is hereby repelled. The relevant portion from Head Note-(b) is reproduced as under:
“Functions performed by the Ex-officio Justice of Peace were not executive, administrative or ministerial inasmuch as he did not carry out, manage or deal with things mechanically. Such functions as described in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Section 22-A (6), Cr.P.C. were quasi-judicial as Ex-officio Justice of Peace entertained applications, examined the record, heard the parties, passed orders and issued directions with the application of mind. Every list before him demanded discretion and judgment. Functions so performed could not be termed as executive, administrative or ministerial on any account.”
10. The next question is “what is the nature of functions which the JOP performs and as to whether the same are executive, administrative, ministerial or quasi-judicial?” Learned counsel for the petitioner while referring the authoritative judgment of learned Full Bench of this Court reported as “Khizer Hayat and others v. Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others” (PLD 2005 Lahore 470) and “Muhammad Ali v. Additional I.G., Faisalabad and others” (PLD 2024 SC 753), has laid much emphasis that the powers and duties of a Justice of the Peace or an ex-officio Justice of the Peace in Pakistan as provided in Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. do not involve any jurisdiction which can be termed as judicial in nature or character and the functions to be performed by a JOP or an ex-officio justice of the Peace are merely administrative and ministerial in nature and character. But subsequently, the Larger Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in a case reported as “Younas Abbas and others vs. Additional Sessions Judge, Chakwal and others” (PLD 2016 SC 581), did not agree with the ratio of the Khizar Hayat and Muhammad Ali’s cases (supra) to the extent of the nature of the functions of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace and held that the functions, the Ex-officio Justice of Peace performs are not executive, administrative or ministerial while the same are quasi-judicial in nature. As such Full Bench decision of this Court in “Khizer Hayat and others v. Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others” (PLD 2005 Lahore 470), and “Muhammad Ali v. Additional I.G., Faisalabad and others” (PLD 2014 SC 753), also stands overruled by Younas Abbas’s case insofar as it says that the powers of the JOP are ministerial. The relevant extract from the above referred judgment of the Larger Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court is reproduced as under:
“11. The duties, the Justice of Peace performs, are executive, administrative, preventive and ministerial as is evident from sub-Sections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Sections 22-A and 22-B of the, Cr.P.C. Such duties have not been a subject-matter of controversy nor have they ever been caviled at by anybody. Controversy emerged with the insertion of sub-section (6) in Section 22-A and Section 25 of the, Cr.P.C. when the Sessions Judges and on nomination by them the Additional Sessions Judges became the Ex-Officio Justices of Peace. The functions, the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace performs, are not executive, administrative or ministerial inasmuch as he does not carry out, manage or deal with things mechanically. His functions as described in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-section (6) of Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. are quasi-judicial as he entertains applications, examines the record, hears the parties, passes orders and issues directions with due application of mind. Every lis before him demands discretion and judgment. Functions so performed cannot be termed as executive, administrative or ministerial on any account. We thus don’t agree with the ratio of the judgments rendered in the cases of Khizar Hayat and others v. Inspector General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others (PLD 2005 Lahore 470) and Muhammad Ali v. Additional I.G. (PLD 2015 SC 753) inasmuch as it hold (sic) that the functions performed by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace are executive, administrative or ministerial.”
From the perusal of above, it can safely be held that the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that “the JOP has no judicial powers or judicial functions to perform under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. and all his powers and functions are administrative and ministerial in nature” is not in consonance with the judgment of the Larger Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court mentioned supra.
11. The next point for consideration is that how the JOP should decide the applications under Section 22-A (6), Cr.P.C. while exercising his powers under quasi-judicial? In “ Namit Sharma v. Union of India, [2013] 13 SCR 1, the Supreme Court of India observed that a quasi-judicial act requires that “a decision is to be given not arbitrarily or in mere discretion of the authority but according to the facts and circumstances of the case as determined upon an inquiry held by the authority after giving an opportunity to the affected parties of being heard or wherever necessary of leading evidence in support of their contention.” It is significant to point out here that before “Younas Abbas and others v. Additional Sessions Judge, Chakwal, and others” (PLD 2016 SC 581), it was the Courts consistent view that the ‘proposed accused’ does not have the right to be heard by the JOP when he considers an application seeking registration of a case. However, Younas Abbas’s case mentioned supra has changed the situation. The use of the words “examines the record, hears the parties” contemplates hearing the proposed accused and going beyond the contents of the application for registration of case to determine whether sufficient incriminating material exists to justify the direction. The legal jurisprudence in our country is well settled that registration of FIR is not an adverse order. In this view of the matter, the Full Bench in Khizer Hayat’s case held that it is neither obligatory for the Officer In-charge of police station nor the JOP to afford an opportunity of hearing to the accused party before the registration of a criminal case or issuing a direction in that regard. The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s holding in Younas Abbas‘s case that the JOP exercises quasi-judicial functions does not overrule that said principle. As such, the JOP does not have the absolute duty to hear the accused while deciding an application under Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. and he may afford him audience only if the circumstances demand so. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in that respect.
12. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned JOP has committed illegality while calling report from the Police is concerned, although an Ex-officio Justice of Peace is not bound to seek report from the police but when a report is called, then it should not be ignored. Reliance is placed on “Mureed Hussain v s. Additional Sessions Judge/Justice of Peace Jampur and 3 others” (2014 P.Cr.L.J. 1146), the relevant portion is reproduced as under:
“7. An-Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is not bound to seek report from the police at every cost and he is fully competent to decide the application and pass an order, even without any report by the police. But when a report is called, to know the truth and real facts, as per the above-mentioned dictum, then it should not be ignored. If Ex-Officio Justice of Peace does not agree with the report, then should give the reasons. Seeking and obtaining a police report but ignoring and passing an order contrary to it, without assigning any reason could not be appreciated. Special care to this situation is required.
Reliance is also placed on “Jamal Khan versus Secretary Home Department” (2021 SCMR 468), wherein the report submitted by the police did not support petitioner ’s claim and there was consensus that both the sides were locked in a dispute of civil nature. Against such peculiar backdrop, refusal by the Justice of Peace to issue direction to the Station House Officer and non-interference by the High Court therewith did not suffer from any jurisdictional error or flaw as such petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.
13. No doubt, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that an inquiry cannot be conducted by the Police before the registration of the case is correct but it is evident from the record that the petitioner had concealed material facts in his application and if report is not summoned from the local Police, the registration of the case on the simple application of the petitioner may causes harassment to innocent persons and would also be abuse of process of law. Furthermore, where the Court felt that a preliminary inquiry or pre-registration inquiry can take place in the cases where the information was cryptic, without any substance, uncertain or vague which could create a doubt in the mind of the Court that the information laid before him does not clearly disclose commission of a cognizable offence and there is a need to conduct a further inquiry before registration of an FIR. Reliance is placed on “Khalid Anwar vs. Ex-officio Justice of Peace, Lahore and 3 others” (2013 P.Cr.L.J. 684).
14. Adverting to the merits of the case, having looked through the documents as well as the order impugned before me, I am of the considered view that there is nothing in the impugned order which could warrant interference by this Court. The contents of the application submitted by the petitioner qua the registration of the case are falsified as according to petitioner the occurrence had taken place on 28.2.2020 and besides the complainant the occurrence was witnessed by Ali Shamshair and Sadaqat, whereas, perusal of the record depicts otherwise, which transpires that the cited witness of the occurrence namely, Ali Shamshair was on judicial remand on 28.2.2020 in case FIR No. 239/2020, registered under Sections 380/411, PPC, thus, it could not be possible for him to witness the occurrence as such
from the face of it chances of false registration of the case with ulterior motives cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, from the contents of application, it has been gathered that the petitioner is just trying to blackmail the proposed accused in order to settle some scores as prior to this, son of the petitioner got a criminal case registered under Section 506-B, PPC against Khalid Shah etc, who were employees of Moeen Chishti, whereas, during the course of investigation said accused were found not connected. Even otherwise, the police also did not get any supportive evidence in favour of the petitioner as such the learned JOP has rightly refused to issue direction to the SHO concerned to register the case against the respondent. Reliance is placed on “Jamal Khan vs. Secretary Home Department” (2021 SCMR 468). In the attending circumstances, the learned Ex-officio Justice of Peace has no other option except to consider the report and parawise comments furnished by the SHO concerned as the narration of application under Section 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. also reveals a false and baseless allegation. Even otherwise, report and parawise comments furnished by the police cannot be brushed aside if requisitioned by the learned trial Court. Reliance is placed on “Mureed Hussain vs. Additional Sessions Judge/Justice of Peace Jampur and 3 others” (2014 P.Cr.L.J. 1146) and “Khizer Hayat and others v. Inspector General of Police (Punjab) Lahore and others” (PLD 2005 Lahore 470).
15. For what has been discussed above, I do find no merit in the instant writ petition which is hereby dismissed. However, the petitioner is at liberty to file a private complaint before the competent forum, if so advised.
(Y.A.) Petition dismissed
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