P L D 2019 Supreme Court 64
(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----S.295-C---Blasphemy---Conviction---Scope---Individuals or a gathering (mob) could not be allowed to decide as to whether any act falling within the purview of S.295-C, P.P.C. had been committed or not, because, it was the mandate of the Court to make such decision after conducting a fully qualified trial and on the basis of credible evidence brought before it---No such parallel authority could in any circumstances be bestowed upon any individual or a group of persons.
Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. The State PLD 2016 SC 17 ref.
(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----S. 295-C---Blasphemy---Appeal, filing of---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Appeal filed before the Supreme Court Against award of death sentence was barred by 11 days---When the present appeal was filed, the appellant was in jail and confined to death cell---Appellant had been sentenced to death, thus, it was appropriate to appraise the evidence to ensure that the conviction and sentence recorded against her had been validly recorded---Besides, the matter of life and death of a lady was involved,therefore, the appeal should not be dismissed on mere technicalities---Delay in filing of the appeal was condoned in circumstances.
(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----S. 295-C---Use of derogatory remarks in respect of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) Blasphemy---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Accused, who was a Christian lady, was alleged to have uttered derogatory remarks against the Holy Prophet (pbuh) in front of several women---Two of these women (prosecution witnesses) narrated the matter to thelocal cleric/complainant, who called the accused in a public meeting and inquired about the occurrence, where the accused allegedly confessed her guilt---Trial Court awarded death sentence to the accused, which sentence was confirmed by the High Court---[Per Mian Saqib Nisar, CJ: Factum of quarrel between the accused and other women (prosecution witnesses) prior to the allegation of blasphemy was proved from the record---First Information Report(FIR) was registered with a delay of 5 days---Admittedly, there were 25-30 ladies present at the spot when the accused allegedly passed blasphemous remarks against the Prophet Muhammad (), however, none of the other ladies except two, who were also prosecution witnesses, reported the matter to anyone---Many Inconsistencies/discrepancies were found in the statements of the two women who are introduced as prosecution witnesses inasmuch as variations were made by them from their earlier statements recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C.---Further there were also discrepancies between the examination-in-chief of the complainant and the complaint lodged by him---Such material contradictions and inconsistent statements of the witnesses and complainant cast further doubts on the coherence of the evidence pertaining to the questions as to who informed the complainant about the occurrence; who was present at the time of disclosure regarding the allegation made against the accused; how many people were present at the time of the public gathering; where did the public gathering take place;what was the time and duration of the public gathering; what was the distance between the place of the public gathering and the house of the accused and how and who brought the accused to the public gathering---Certain contradictions were also present in the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of a police officer/prosecution witness regarding the place and time of arrest of accused---Prosecution had categorically failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt---Conviction and sentence of death awarded to the accused was set aside in circumstances and she was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed accordingly]---[Per Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J, agreeing: Original FIRe was in the shape of a written application which had statedly been drafted by an Advocate, however the complainant, the initiator of the present criminal case,did not remember who had drafted the application for the purpose of lodging the FIR and he didn't even know where and before whom the said application has been presented by him for the purpose of getting an FIR registered---Apparently Something else was happening behind the scene and the actual movers of the present criminal case were some others who had never come to the fore---Prosecution witnesses before whom the alleged remarks were made were young girls and sisters inter se and were semi-literate who had statedly received some elementary religious education from the wife of the complainant/local cleric---Said prosecution witnesses had never stated as to who was addressed by the accused at the time of uttering the derogatory remarks, and they had never disclosed in whose field the alleged incident had taken place and they had not themselves lodged any report about the same with the local police---According to the prosecution itself, the accused had allegedly uttered the derogatory words after the accused's religion (Christianity) was insulted and her religious sensibilities had been injured by her Muslim co-worker ladies(prosecution witnesses)---Owner of the field where the alleged incident took place and before whom the accused allegedly confessed and sought pardon, was introduced in the present case at some later stage by way of an afterthought---Belated surfacing of the said witness was quite suspicious and in all likelihood he had been planted in the present case at some subsequent stage---Evidence brought on record to establish the time and date when thelocal cleric/complainant was informed about the alleged remarks was not free from doubt---Matter was reported to the police after a delay of five days with the explanation that the complainant and villagers personally investigated and looked into the matter and wanted to be satisfied before reporting thematter---No detail of any such investigation or consultation by the complainant party or of verification by the complainant had been divulged before the Trial Court nor any evidence had been produced in such regard---In the FIR lodged no mention whatsoever had been made of any public gathering where the accused allegedly confessed her guilt and sought pardon---Statements made by the complainant and prosecution witnesses before the court with respect to the date and time of the public gathering were mutually contradictory---Evidence Produced by the prosecution about where the public gathering had been held, how many people had participated in that gathering, who had brought the accused to the gathering, how the accused was brought to the gathering and the time consumed in the meeting was replete with glaring contradictions exposing complete falsity of the prosecution's story---Record of the case showed that the accused and her forefathers had been living in the same village since before the year 1947 and during all this while no such incident or quarrel over religions of the parties had ever taken place---Prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt---Conviction and death sentence of the accused recorded and upheld by the courts below were set aside and she was acquitted of the charge by extending the benefit of doubt to her.
(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 154---Delay in lodging First Information Report (FIR)---Effect---In absence of any plausible explanation, the Supreme Court had always considered the delay in lodging of FIR to be fatal and itcasted a suspicion on the prosecution story, extending the benefit of doubt to the accused---If there was any delay in lodging of FIR and commencement of investigation, it gave rise to a doubt, which, could not be extended to anyone else except to the accused.
Zeeshan@ Shani v. The State 2012 SCMR 428; Noor Muhammad v. The State 2010 SCMR 97 and Muhammad Faiz Khan v. Ajmer Khan 2010 SCMR 105 ref.
(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 154---First Information Report (FIR) lodged after conducting an inquiry---Such FIR lost its evidentiary value.
Iftikhar Hussain and others v. The State 2004 SCMR 1185 ref.
(f) Criminal trial ---
----Benefit of doubt---Scope---For the accused to be afforded the right of benefit of the doubt, it was not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating uncertainty---If a single circumstance created reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the apprehension of guilt of an accused, then he/she shall be entitled to such benefit not as a matter of grace and concession, but as a right.
Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 ref.
(g) Criminal trial--
----Extra-judicial confession---Scope and reliance---Evidence of extra-judicial confession was a fragile piece of evidence and utmost care and caution had to be exercised in placing reliance on such a confession---Such confession was always looked at with doubt and suspicion due to the ease with which it may be concocted---Legal worth of the extra judicial confession was almost equal to naught, keeping in view the natural course of events, human behaviour, conduct and probabilities ordinary course---Extra-judicial confession could be taken as corroborative of the charge if it, in the first instance, rang true and then found support from other evidence of unimpeachable character---If the other evidence lacked such attribute, it had to be excluded from consideration.
Nasir Javed v. State 2016 SCMR 1144; Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others 2016 SCMR 274; Imran alias Dully v. The State 2015 SCMR 155; Hamid Nadeem v. The State 2011 SCMR 1233; Muhammad Aslam v. Sabir Hussain 2009 SCMR 985; Sajid Mumtaz and others v. Basharat and others 2005 SCMR 231; Ziaul Rehmanv. The State 2000 SCMR 528 and Sarfraz Khan v. The State and 2 others 1996 SCMR 188 ref.
(h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-
----S. 295-C---Use of derogatory remarks in respect of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)---Blasphemy---Reappraisal of evidence---Extra-judicial confession---Accused, who was a Christian lady, was alleged to have uttered derogatory remarks against the Holy Prophet (pbuh) and she allegedly confessed her guilt in a public gathering---Trial Court awarded death sentence to the accused, which sentence was confirmed by the High Court---Held, that accused was brought to a gathering of potentially hundreds of people, where she was alone at the time, tensions were running high, and it was an intimidating environment---Accused may well have felt threatened and vulnerable, thus, the alleged extra-judicial confession made by her, even if presumed to have been made before the public gathering, could not be termed as voluntary action nor could it be relied upon to form the basis of conviction, especially for capital punishment---Conviction and sentence of death awarded to the accused was set aside in circumstances and she was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed accordingly.
(i) Criminal trial--
----Cross-examination---Defence failing torcross-examine prosecution witnesses qua certain aspects of the case---Principle That 'part of statement which remained unrebutted amounted to admission' was not applicable to criminal cases---In criminal cases, the burden to prove the guilt of the accused rested heavily upon the prosecution, which had to prove its case beyond any shadow of doubt.
Nadeem Ramzan v. The State 2018 SCMR 249; S. Mahmood Aslam Shah v. The State PLD 1987SC 250 and State v. Rab Nawaz and another PLD 1974 SC 87 ref.
(j) Criminal trial---
----Presumption of innocence---Scope---Suchpresumption remained throughout the case until such time the prosecution on the evidence satisfied the Court beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty of the offence alleged against him.
(k) Criminal trial---
----Standard of proof---Scope---Suspicion however grave or strong could never be a proper substitute for the standard of proof required in a criminal case, i.e. beyond reasonable doubt.
(l) Criminal trial ---
----Standard of proof---Scope---Cases where there was enmity between the accused and the complainant or prosecution witnesses usually a strict standard of proof was applied for determining the innocence or guilt of the accused.
Per Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J; agreeing with Mian Saqib Nisar, J
(m) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 154---First Information Report (FIR) lodged with a noticeable delay and after consultations and deliberations---Such FIR lost its credibility.
Saif-ul-Malook,Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.
Zubair Ahmed Farooq, Addl. P.G. for the State.
Ghulam Mustafa Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.
Date of hearing: 8th October, 2018
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