Principles---Whether compounding of offence under S.345(2), Cr.P.C, related to compounding under S.310, P.P.C and not to waiver under S.309, P.P.C.--

  P L D 2016 Supreme Court 347

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---
----S. 345(1) & (2)---Compounding of offence with and without permission of court---Principles---Section 345(1), Cr.P.C. enlisted the offences which may be compounded by the specified persons without intervention of any court---Compounding in such cases took effect from the moment the compromise was completely entered into by the parties, the relevant court which was to try the offence in issue was left with no jurisdiction to refuse to give effect to such a compromise and a party to such a compromise could not resile from the compromise at any subsequent stage of the case---On the other hand S.345(2), Cr.P.C. dealt with cases in which the offences specified therein could be compounded only with the permission of the court and in all such cases any compromise arrived at between the parties on their own at any stage was not to take effect at all unless the court permitted such compromise to be given effect to and the relevant court for the purpose was the court before which prosecution for the relevant offence was pending.
(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----Ss. 345(2), (6), (7) & 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Compromise without permission of court---Scope---Offence falling with in the ambit of S.345(2), Cr.P.C.---Compounding of such offence at the stage of bail could not be given effect to at the stage of trial when at the stage of trial the compounding had been resiled from by legal heirs of the deceased---Neither the legal heirs of the deceased nor the Commission appointed by court appeared before Trial Court in support of the compromise, thus, no verified, valid or subsisting compromise existed before the Trial Court during the stage of trial for according the requisite permission to compound the offence in terms of the requirements of S.345(2), Cr.P.C.
Accused was granted ad interim pre-arrest bail by Trial Court. During the pendency of his pre-arrest bail application a compromise deed was executed between the legal heirs and accused wherein it had been stated that the heirs of deceased had no objection to confirmation of the accused's ad interim pre-arrest bail or to his acquittal in the main case. Trial Court appointed a Commission for recording of statements of the heirs of deceased for confirming the factum of compromise between the parties. Commission recorded a joint statement of the heirs of deceased and in that statement the heirs of the deceased maintained that they had no objection to confirmation of the appellant's ad interim pre-arrest bail or to his acquittal. Accused's ad interim pre-arrest bail was confirmed by the Trial Court. Upon completion of the investigation of the case a challan against accused was submitted before the Court of Session for trial. Application was submitted by the accused under section 345(6), Cr.P.C. seeking his acquittal in the case on the basis of the compromise already entered into by the parties at the stage of bail but the Sessions Judge, dismissed the said application because by that time the heirs of the deceased had resiled from the compromise.
Issue in the present case was whether or not compounding of a criminal offence at the stage of bail could still be given effect to at the stage of trial when at the stage of trial the compounding had been resiled from by one of the parties.
Offence involved in the present case was that under section 302, P.P.C. which fell squarely within the ambit of section 345(2), Cr.P.C. and, therefore a compromise arrived at between the parties at the stage of bail when even the Challan had not been submitted before trial Court, could not validly have been accepted as a compromise and the trial court could not have accepted any such compromise when before the trial court the heirs of the deceased were not willing to abide by the earlier agreement entered into by them with the accused. Apart from that there was no verification of the list of heirs of the deceased available before the trial court, the heirs of the deceased had not appeared before the trial court for getting their statements recorded in support of the compromise, the Commission before whom the heirs of the deceased had acknowledged the factum of compromise had not appeared before the trial court and, thus, there was no verified, valid or subsisting compromise before the trial court for according the requisite permission to compound the offence in terms of the requirements of section 345(2), Cr.P.C. If the requirements of section 345(2), Cr.P.C. did not stand fulfilled then, as expressly forbidden by section 345(7), Cr.P.C., the trial court could not have accepted the application filed by the accused for his acquittal on the basis of the claimed compromise. Appeal was dismissed accordingly.
(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 345(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 304, 309 & 310---Waiver (afw) of right of qisas in Qatl-i-amd---Compounding of qisas (sulh) in Qatl-i-amd---Principles---Whether compounding of offence under S.345(2), Cr.P.C, related to compounding under S.310, P.P.C and not to waiver under S.309, P.P.C.---Provisions of Ss.309 & 310, P.P.C. were relevant only to cases of Qisas and not to cases of Ta'zir and a case was to be a case of Qisas only where the provisions of S.304, P.P.C. stood attracted, i.e. where the accused person confessed his guilt before the Trial Court or where Tazkiya-tul-shahood of the witnesses was conducted by the Trial Court before trial of the accused person as required by Art.17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Both such steps required to make a case one of Qisas were relevant to a Trial Court and, thus, even waiver or compounding provided for in Ss.309 & 310 were relevant to a Trial Court and not to any stage before the case reached the Trial Court.













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