PLJ 2023 Cr.C. 299
Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860)--
----Ss. 302(b) & 452--Conviction and sentence--Challenge to--Benefit of doubt--Testimony of chance witness--Medical evidence--Held: It is, by now well-established principle of law that it is prosecution, which has to prove its case against accused by standing on its own legs, but in this case prosecution remained failed to discharge its responsibility-- The prosecution is under obligation to prove its case against accused person at standard of proof required in criminal cases, namely, beyond reasonable doubt standard, and cannot be said to have discharged this obligation by producing evidence that merely meets preponderance of probability standard applied in civil cases--If prosecution fails to discharge its said obligation and there remains a reasonable doubt, not an imaginary or artificial doubt, as to guilt of accused person, benefit of that doubt is to be given to accused person as of right, not as of concession--The rule of giving benefit of doubt to accused person is essentially a rule of caution and prudence, and is deep rooted in our jurisprudence for safe administration of criminal justice--In common law, it is based on maxim, “It is better that ten guilty persons be acquitted rather than one innocent person be convicted”--While in Islamic criminal law it is based on high authority of sayings of Holy Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him): “Avert punishments [hudood] when there are doubts”; and “Drive off ordained crimes from Muslims as far as you can--If there is any place of refuge for him [accused], let him have his way, because leader’s mistake in pardon is better than his mistake in punishment”. [Pp. 310 & 311] G, I & J
Testimony of chance witness--
----It has now been well settled that for conviction of an accused person it would be highly unsafe to rely upon testimony of a chance witness when remained uncorroborated and for conviction of a accused on capital charge on basis of testimony of chance witness, Court has to be at guard and corroboration has to be sought for relying upon such evidence. [P. 306] A
2017 SCMR 1710.
Chance witness--
----Testimony of chance witness, ordinarily, is not accepted unless justifiable reasons are shown to establish his presence at crime scene at relevant time--In normal course, presumption under law would operate about his absence from crime spot--True that in rare cases, testimony of chance witness may be relied upon, provided some convincing explanations appealing to prudent mind for his presence on crime spot are put forth, when occurrence took place otherwise, his testimony would fall within category of suspect evidence and cannot be accepted without a pinch of salt--A chance witness is one who happens to be at place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course--In other words, he is not expected to be in said place--A person walking on a street witnessing commission of an offence can be a chance witness--Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed though a little more scrutiny may be required at times--This again is an aspect which is to be looked into in a given case by Court. [Pp. 306 & 307] B
2015 SCMR 1142, 2017 SCMR 142 & 2020 SCMR 192.
Evidence--
----It is by now well settled that medical evidence is a type of supporting evidence, which may confirm prosecution version with regard to receipt of injury, nature of injury, kind of weapon used in occurrence but it would not identify assailant.. [P. 308] C
2010 SCMR 846, 2012 SCMR 327, 2017 SCMR 486 & 2018 SCMR 772.
Direct or substantive evidence--
----It is not expected from appellant that he would have kept said empty cartridge along with weapon of offence in order to produce same before police for creating evidence against him--In these circumstances, positive report of FSL is of no avail to prosecution and is inconsequential--Even otherwise, it is also well settled that unless direct or substantive evidence is brought on record, conviction cannot be recorded on basis of such type of evidence howsoever convincing it may be. [P. 309] D
2007 SCMR 142.
Testimony of sole witness--
----Testimony of sole witness cannot be excluded from consideration is concerned, in this respect, this Court deems it appropriate to dilate upon acceptability and reliability of uncorroborated testimony of a solitary witness in a prosecution case to arrive at guilt of accused--The well-known maxim that “Evidence has to be weighed and not counted” marks a departure from English law where a number of statutes still prohibit convictions for certain categories of offences on testimony of a single witness. [P. 309] E
2018 SCMR 772.
Oral testimony of witness--
----Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories (1) wholly reliable (2) wholly unreliable and (3) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable--In first category of proof, Court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way -it may convict or may acquit on testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above approach of suspicion of interestedness, incompetence of subordination--In second category, Court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion--It is in third category of cases, that Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial--There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses--Irrespective of quality of oral evidence of a single witness, if Courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subordination of witnesses--Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact--The Court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that evidence is feasible and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony--The law reports contain many precedents where Court had to depend and act upon testimony of a single witness in support of prosecution--But, if there are doubts about testimony Courts will insist on corroboration--It is for Court to act upon testimony of witnesses--It is not number, quantity, but quality that is material--The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted--The test is whether evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise.? However, in combined consideration of above facts and circumstances, this Court finds that evidence of solitary witness namely P.W.6/Ghulam Haider was required strong corroboration, to which prosecution has been failed to establish that his evidence as cogent, credible and trustworthy thereby making prosecution case doubtful. [Pp. 309 & 310] F
AIR (1962) (SC) 424, AIR (1974) SC 276 & AIR (1976) SC 560.
Benefit of doubt--
----It is also well-established principle of law that if there is a single circumstance which creates doubt regarding prosecution case, same is sufficient to give benefit of doubt to accused, whereas, instant case is replete with number of circumstances which have created serious doubt about prosecution story. [P. 311] H
Syed Zeeshan Haider, Advocate; Mr. Hassan Mehmood Ch., Advocate and Mr. Muneeb Majeed Ch. Advocate for Appellant.
Mr. Jam Muhammad Tariq, DPG for State.
Sardar Muhammad Abbas Khan, Advocate and Mian Muhammad Salman Idrees, Advocate for Complainant.
Date of hearing: 22.9.2022.
PLJ 2023 Cr.C. 299
[Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench]
Present: Sardar Muhammad Sarfraz Dogar, J.
LIAQUAT ALI--Appellant
versus
STATE etc.--Respondents
Crl. A. No. 350-J of 2015, heard on 22.9.2022.
Judgment
This judgment shall dispose of captioned criminal appeal filed by appellant Liaquat Ali against his conviction and sentence inflicted upon him vide judgment dated 22.06.2015, rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Liaquatpur, in case FIR No. 181/2013 dated 22.03.2013, registered under sections 302, 452, 109, 337-H(ii), PPC at Police Station Shedani, whereby, he was convicted and sentenced as under:
Under Section 302(b), PPC: Life Imprisonment as Ta’zir, along with the direction to pay Rs. 100,000/-as compensation under Section 544-A, Cr.P.C. to the legal heirs of deceased. In default whereof, to further undergo six months S.I.
Under Section 452, PPC: Rigorous Imprisonment for seven years along with fine of Rs. 20,000/-, in default of payment whereof to further undergo two months S.I.
Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently and he was also extended benefit of Section 382-B of Cr.P.C. however, through the same judgment, co-accused of the appellant namely Abdul Hakeem was acquitted of the charge.
2. Brief facts of the case, as disclosed by Ghulam Haider/ complainant (PW.6) and contained in complaint (Exh.P.B) are that on the day of occurrence i.e. 22.03.2013, at 04:00 p.m, appellant Liaquat Ali while armed with pistol 30-Bore along with co-accused Muhammad Ali armed with pistol 12-Bore (not facing trial being Proclaimed offender), Mustafa alias Kali armed with pistol 12-Bore (not facing trial being Proclaimed offender) along with one unknown accused armed with pistol 30-Bore, at the abetment of acquitted accused Abdul Hakeem, after committing house trespass, committed the murder of Mst. Nasreen Bibi, daughter of complainant.
3. After recording the formal FIR (Ex.P.C), Muhammad Yaqoob S.I (PW.5), inspected the place of occurrence, made inspection note and also prepared rough site plan (Ex.P.G). He arrested the accused persons and got recovered pistol (P.4) along with two live cartridges (P.5/1-2) along with one crime empty from appellant Liaquat Ali vide recovery memo Ex.P.J. he also got prepared scaled site plans (Ex.P.D & Ex.P.D/1), injury statement (Ex.P.E) and inquest report (Ex.P.F) of deceased Nasreen Bibi.
4. After completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and submitted before the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court, after observing legal formalities, as provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 framed charge against the appellant along with acquitted accused Abdul Hakeem on 23.09.2013, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
5. In order to prove its case, the prosecution produced 12 witnesses, during the trial. The complainant Ghulam Haider (PW.6) witnessed the occurrence whereas Muhammad Arshad (PW.7) and Faqeer Bukhsh (not produced) attracted at the spot after hearing hullabaloo.
6. After completion of prosecution evidence, the statements of the appellant and acquitted accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, were recorded by the learned trial Court on 08.06.2015 wherein they refuted the allegations levelled against them and professed their innocence. While answering to a question that “Why this case against you and why the PWs have deposed against you?” the appellant replied as under:
“Complainant Ghulam Haider involved me, my brother Muhammad Ali and my brother in law (Behnoi) Ghulam Mustafa alias Kali just to revenge of not giving the hands of my sister namely Yasmeen in watta with Muhammad Nadeem S/O Ghulam Haider complainant.”
The appellant neither opted to make statement on oath as envisaged under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C., nor he produced any evidence in his defence.
7. Upon the conclusion of trial, the learned trial Court found the prosecution’s case against the appellant to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and, thus, he was convicted and sentenced as mentioned and detailed above whereas acquitted his co-accused giving him benefit of doubt. Hence, the present appeal.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant, in support of this appeal, contends that prosecution has miserably failed to bring home the guilt against the convict by producing trustworthy and convincing evidence; that witnesses are chance witnesses who have failed to establish their presence at the spot; that partial story of complainant has already been disbelieved by the investigating officer by declaring the co-accused Muhammad Ali and Ghulam Mustafa as innocent; that it has been proved during the course of investigation that the complainant has involved the accused persons due to the grudge of “Watta Satta” marriage; that it is settled law that the medical evidence may confirm the ocular evidence with regard to seat of injury and its duration, nature of injury and kind of weapon used for causing such injury but it cannot connect the accused with the commission of the crime, until and unless there is some other evidence, which is very much lacking in this case, therefore, this piece of evidence is of no avail to the prosecution; that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt; thus, the appeal be accepted and the appellant may be acquitted from the charge.
9. On the other hand, learned DPG for the State assisted by learned counsel for the complainant, vehemently opposes this appeal on the grounds that the prosecution has proved the case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt; that the sentence of life imprisonment was rightly awarded to the appellant and the same may be maintained, appeal may be dismissed.
10. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant and the learned law officer assisted by learned counsel for the complainant and also gone through the record with their able assistance.
11. As per story narrated by complainant Ghulam Haider (PW.6) in complaint (Ex.P.B) and evidence produced by the prosecution, the unfortunate occurrence was witnessed by the complainant (PW.6), Muhammad Arshad (PW.7) and Faqir Bakhsh (not produced). It has been gathered from the record that the permanent residence of complainant PW.6 is at Pacca Laran whereas PW.7 Muhammad Arshad is also resident of village Pacca Laran while the PW. Faqir Bukhsh was resident of Mouza Kotla Miran, Tehsil Khanpur. This fact of PWs’ not resident of place of occurrence i.e. Shehbazpur Gharbi, has also been admitted by the complainant and PW.7. Therefore, the first & foremost responsibility of the prosecution was to satisfy the presence of not only complainant but also the PWs at the place of occurrence at the relevant time as the place of occurrence is neither same nor adjacent to place of residence of PWs. To look into this fact of great concern, this Court has scanned the record with due cautious manner and found that not even a single gesture has been made by the prosecution to prove the presence of PWs at the spot at relevant time of affairs. The first document i.e. complaint (Ex.P.B), which set the law into motion is also silent in respect of purpose of presence of PWs at the spot. The relevant lines of Exh.P.B are hereby reproduced for ready reference:
"۔۔۔ میرے شور واویلہ اور فائرنگ کی آواز سن کر محمد ارشد ولد الہیٰ بخش قوم چانڈیہ بلوچ سکنہ پکالاڑاں اور فقیر بخش ولد حاجی رسول بخش قوم چانڈیہ بلوچ سکنہ/موضع کوٹلہ میرن و دیگر ہمسائیگان آگئے جن کو آتا دیکھ کر لیاقت علی وغیرہ اپنا اپنا اسلحہ لہراتے ہوئے موٹر سائیکل ہائے پر بیٹھ کر فرار ہونے میں کامیاب ہو گئے ۔۔۔"
Similarly, the complainant while appearing in the witnesses box as PW.6, during the course of his cross-examination deposed that PW. Muhammad Arshad is his son in law. He further admitted it correct that house of Muhammad Arshad is at Pacca Laran, however he used to live with me. He showed his ignorance about the inter-se distance between Pacca Laran to place of occurrence (Shehbazpur Gharbi). He goes on to depose that the PW Faqir Bukhsh is also his son in law and he is residing at Mouza Kotla Miran, tehsil Khanpur. He also showed ignorance qua the inter-se distance between Kotla Miran to place of occurrence (Shehbazpur Gharbi) and in respect of time consumed to go to Kotla Miran from Shehbazpur Gharbi. The relevant extract of his deposition is hereby reproduced for ready reference:
“… PW Muhammad Arshad is my son in law. It is correct that his house is at Pacca Laran, however he used to live with me. I cannot tell the distance between Pacca Laran to place of occurrence (Shehbazpur Gharbi). I cannot tell the how much time consumed to go to Pacca Laran from Shehbazpur Gharbi. The PW Faqir Bukhsh is also my son in law and he is residing at Mouza Kotla Miran, tehsil Khanpur. I cannot tell the distance between Kotla Miran to place of occurrence (Shehbazpur Gharbi)…”
But, it is again disappointing to note here that the prosecution has failed to prove the purpose of presence of PWs at relevant time even during the course of investigation. The I.O of the case appeared as PW.5 and deposed during the course of cross-examination, quite astonishingly, what to say about the purpose of presence of PWs, outrightly negated their status being eye witness of the occurrence by admitting it correct that the PWs did not see the occurrence. The relevant line is reproduced hereunder:
“It is correct that the PWs did not see the occurrence.”
Therefore, this Court feels no hesitation that the PWs being chance witnesses have failed to prove their presence at the spot at the relevant time of occurrence. It has now been well settled that for conviction of an accused person it would be highly unsafe to rely upon testimony of a chance witness when remained uncorroborated and for conviction of a accused on capital charge on the basis of testimony of chance witness, the Court has to be at guard and corroboration has to be sought for relying upon such evidence.[1] A chance witness, in legal parlance is the one who claims that he was present on the crime spot at the fateful time, albeit, his presence there was sheer chance as in the ordinary course of business, place of residence and normal course of events, he was not supposed to be present on the spot but at a place where he resides, carries on business or runs day to day life affairs. It is in this context that the testimony of chance witness, ordinarily, is not accepted unless justifiable reasons are shown to establish his presence at the crime scene at the relevant time. In normal course, the presumption under the law would operate about his absence from the crime spot. True that in rare cases, the testimony of chance witness may be relied upon, provided some convincing explanations appealing to prudent mind for his presence on the crime spot are put forth, when the occurrence took place otherwise, his testimony would fall within the category of suspect evidence and cannot be accepted without a pinch of salt.[2] A chance witness is the one who happens to be at the place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. A person walking on a street witnessing the commission of an offence can be a chance witness. Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed though a little more scrutiny may be required at times. This again is an aspect which is to be looked into in a given case by the Court.[3]
12. Now, comes to the evidence adduced by Ghulam Haider complainant (PW6), who is father of Mst. Nasreen Bibi deceased. Though Ghulam Haider complainant while appearing in the witness box as (PW6) during the cross-examination has unequivocally stated that he is permanently resident of Pakka Lara yet the prosecution has badly failed to substantiate this fact through any iota of tangible evidence that when the complainant had his own house at Pakka Lara then why he was residing at a rented house at Shahbazpur. It appears that the story of living in a rented house has been concocted in order to establish his presence at the spot at the relevant time, which otherwise, is not plausible as neither it was his routine nor he had any business or any special reason to go at the place of occurrence. Even otherwise, complainant Ghulam Haider (PW6) during the cross-examination had failed to narrate the distance between the two places, i.e. Pakka Lara and Shahbazpur, which raises an eyebrow qua the residing of the complainant in the rented house at Shahbazpur and seeing of the occurrence being an eye-witness. Moreso, the owner of the said rented house could easily substantiate the factum of residing of the complainant in the said house but neither he has been produced by the prosecution nor any rent deed was adduced in this regard. Similarly, there is another intriguing aspect of the matter which casts doubt qua the prosecution story as the complainant during the cross-examination has stated that his son aged about 11/12 years and his wife were also present when the occurrence had taken place but surprisingly neither any of them was produced during investigating or during the trial. So withholding of these important witnesses in the peculiar circumstances of this case without any justifiable cause leads the Court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution within the purview of Article 129 (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 that had they been produced before the learned trial Court, they may have not supported the prosecution version.[4]
13. Yet there is another glaring aspect of the case, the autopsy on the dead body of the deceases was conducted at 6.00 p.m. on 22.03.2013, while the duration between death and postmortem examination is given as 06 hours, thus, if the time is taken into consideration, the time of occurrence would be round about 12.00 a.m., thus, the medical evidence does not support in any manner the time of death of the deceased or to say the time of occurrence.[5] Even otherwise, it is by now well settled that medical evidence is a type of supporting evidence, which may confirm the prosecution version with regard to receipt of injury, nature of the injury, kind of weapon used in the occurrence but it would not identify the assailant.[6]
14. Furthermore, the conduct of the complainant was found irrational as the doctor who had conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased while appearing in the witness box as PW-9 has opined the time between injury and death as ten minutes but there is nothing on the record that the complainant had made any effort to take the deceased in injured condition to the hospital for her medical treatment. Furthermore, the presence of the complainant has also been falsified as he has insisted that his clothes were stained with blood but neither the blood stained clothes of the complainant were produced nor the same were taken into possession by the Investigating Officer rather the Investigating Officer has deposed during the cross-examination that when he visited the place of occurrence the clothes of the complainant were not stained with blood.
15. Further, As per site plan (Ex.P.G), point No. 1 is the place from where the deceased had received fire-arm injuries and from where the dead body of the deceased was found lying but surprisingly no crime empty of pistol 30 bore was secured by the investigating officer from the said place during his first spot inspection. Even otherwise, in the inquest report (Ex.P.F) in the relevant column No. 23, it has not been shown that any empty was found at the spot near the dead body of the deceased. But, interestingly, Liaquat Ali appellant during his physical remand on 25.04.2013 got recovered pistol (P.4) along with two live cartridges (P.5 to P.6) and one empty cartridge (P.7) from the area of Mouza Shehbazpur near KLP Road in a bush but the said recovery cannot be relied upon for the reason as neither it was the case of the prosecution nor any of the prosecution witnesses have stated that the appellant after the occurrence had taken the empty cartridge along with him. Even otherwise, it is not expected from the appellant that he would have kept the said empty cartridge along with the weapon of offence in order to produce the same before the police for creating evidence against him. In these circumstances, the positive report of FSL (Ex.P.N) is of no avail to the prosecution and is inconsequential. Even otherwise, it is also well settled that unless direct or substantive evidence is brought on record, conviction cannot be recorded on the basis of such type of evidence howsoever convincing it may be.[7]
16. So far as the arguments of learned counsel for the complainant that testimony of sole witness cannot be excluded from consideration is concerned, in this respect, this Court deems it appropriate to dilate upon acceptability and reliability of uncorroborated testimony of a solitary witness in a prosecution case to arrive at the guilt of the accused. The well-known maxim that “Evidence has to be weighed and not counted” marks a departure from the English law where a number of statutes still prohibit convictions for certain categories of offences on the testimony of a single witness. This-difference was noticed by the Privy Council in “Mahamed Sugal Esa Mamasah Rer Alalah v. The King”,[8] wherein it was laid down as under:
“It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant that assuming the unsworn evidence was admissible the Court could not act upon it unless it was corroborated. In England, where provision has been made for the reception of unsworned evidence from a child, it has always been provided that the evidence must be corroborated in some material particularly implicating the accused. But in the Indian Act there is no such provision and the evidence is made admissible whether corroborated or not. Once there is admissible evidence a Court can act upon it; corroboration unless required by statute goes only to the weight and value of the evidence. It is a sound rule in practice not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn or unsworn but, this is a rule of prudence and not of law.”
Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories (1) wholly reliable (2) wholly unreliable and (3) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first category of proof, the Court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way -it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above approach of suspicion of interestedness, incompetence of subordination. In the second category, the Court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if Courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subordination of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The Court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is feasible and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to the suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the Court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution.[9] But, if there are doubts about the testimony the Courts will insist on corroboration. It is for the Court to act upon the testimony of witnesses. It is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise.? However, in the combined consideration of the above facts and circumstances, this Court finds that the evidence of the solitary witness namely P.W.6/Ghulam Haider was required strong corroboration, to which prosecution has been failed to establish that his evidence as cogent, credible and trustworthy thereby making the prosecution case doubtful.
17. This Court has considered all the pros and cons of this case and has come to an irresistible conclusion that the prosecution could not prove its case against the appellant beyond shadow of doubt. It is, by now well-established principle of law that it is the prosecution, which has to prove its case against the accused by standing on its own legs, but in this case the prosecution remained failed to discharge its responsibility. It is also well-established principle of law that if there is
a single circumstance which creates doubt regarding the prosecution case, the same is sufficient to give benefit of doubt to the accused, whereas, the instant case is replete with number of circumstances which have created serious doubt about the prosecution story. The prosecution is under obligation to prove its case against the accused person at the standard of proof required in criminal cases, namely, beyond reasonable doubt standard, and cannot be said to have discharged this obligation by producing evidence that merely meets the preponderance of probability standard applied in civil cases. If the prosecution fails to discharge its said obligation and there remains a reasonable doubt, not an imaginary or artificial doubt, as to the guilt of the accused person, the benefit of that doubt is to be given to the accused person as of right, not as of concession. The rule of giving benefit of doubt to accused person is essentially a rule of caution and prudence, and is deep rooted in our jurisprudence for safe administration of criminal justice. In common law, it is based on the maxim, “It is better that ten guilty persons be acquitted rather than one innocent person be convicted”. While in Islamic criminal law it is based on the high authority of sayings of the Holy Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him): “Avert punishments [hudood] when there are doubts”; and “Drive off the ordained crimes from the Muslims as far as you can. If there is any place of refuge for him [accused], let him have his way, because the leader’s mistake in pardon is better than his mistake in punishment”.[10]
18. In the light of above discussion, I am of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt, therefore, instant criminal appeal is accepted and his conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Liaquatpur vide impugned judgment dated 22.06.2015 is set aside and he is acquitted of the charge by extending him the benefit of doubt. He is in custody, he be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
(A.A.K.) Appeal accepted
[1]. “Anwar Begum vs. Akhter Hussain” (2017 SCMR 1710).
[2]. “Mst. Sughra Begum and another vs. Qaiser Pervez and others” (2015 SCMR 1142) para No. 14. “Muhammad Irshad vs. Allah Ditta and others” (2017 SCMR 142), “Sufyan Nawaz and another vs. The State and others” (2020 SCMR 192).
[3]. “State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy”, (2003) 12 SCC 660).
[4]. 4 “Riaz Ahmad versus The State” (2010 SCMR 846) and “Khalid @ Khalidi and 2 others versus The State” (2012 SCMR 327).
[5]. “Muhammad Asif v. The State” (2017 SCMR 486).
[6]. “Muhammad Mansha vs. The State” (2018 SCMR 772), “Ghulam Mustafa vs. The State” (2009 SCMR 916) and “Naveed Asgahr and 2 others vs. The State” (PLD 2021 SC 600).
[7]. “Muhammad Irshad vs. Allah Ditta and others” (2017 SCMR 142) and “Muhammad Mansha vs. The State” (2018 SCMR 772).
[8]. A.I.R. (1946) P.C.
[9]. Ramratan and Others v. The State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. (1962) S.C. 424; Guli Chand and Others v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. (1974) S.C, 276; Badri v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. (1976) S.C. 560; Vanula Bhushan @ Venuna Knshnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. (1989) S.C. 236 and in Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P., A.I.R, (1994) S.C. 1251.
[10]. “Naveed Asghar and two others vs. The State” (PLD 2021 SC 600).
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