1995 S C M R 626
(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑Art. 13(a)‑‑‑Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 403(1)‑‑‑General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 26‑‑‑Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302/149‑‑Maxim: "Nemo bis puniture aut vexatur pro eodurn deticio" (no one is to be twice vexed for one and the same offence)‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Rule that no man shall be vexed twice for the same offence‑‑‑Application‑‑‑Rule of "autrefois acquit" and rule of "auterefois convict"‑‑‑Protection given by Art, 13(a), Constitution of Pakistan (1973) is against prosecution and double punishment‑‑‑Constitutional guarantee is available only if the accused is convicted and punished and if the first prosecution results in acquittal, the second prosecution is not prohibited‑‑Rule of double jeopardy, however, is found in S. 403(1), Cr.P.C. which prohibits the second trial for an offence during course of existence of conviction or acquittal of a person as the case may be, in consequence of final adjudication of such an offence by a Court of competent jurisdiction‑‑‑Rule against autrefois acquit finds place in S. 403(1), Cr.P.C. and the counterpart of the said rule "autrefois convict” has received recognition in the Constitutional guarantee embodied in Art. 13(a), Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑If one trial ends in conviction and punishment and in the second case accused is acquitted, and the two judgments are placed in juxtaposition and it becomes evident that the judgment of conviction in point of time is rendered first, judgment of conviction will hold the field‑‑‑Subsequent acquittal of accused thus cannot reflect upon his conviction and sentence awarded to him on the basis of the trial‑‑‑Provisions of S. 26, General Clauses Act, 1897, does not debar the simultaneous prosecution but prohibits duplicate punishment and not the trial.
The rule that no one shall be vexed twice for the same offence has its roots in the ancient maxim "Nemo bis puniture aut vexature pro eodum delico" which means that no one should be subjected to peril twice for the same offence. It is a fundamental rule of Criminal Law that no one should be exposed to hazards of punishment and convicted twice for one and the same offence. This doctrine is enshrined deeply in the legal system of the countries following Anglo‑American Jurisprudence. It is incorporated in one form or another in the statutory law, or as a Constitutional guarantee in the Constitutions of some of the countries.
In Constitution of Pakistan (1973), this rule is enacted in Article 13(a).
The protection given by this Article 13(a) of the Constitution is against prosecution and double punishment. By prosecution is meant a trial followed by judgment of acquittal or punishment. It includes the entire proceedings starting with taking cognizance of an offence by the Court, followed by examination of evidence, addressing of arguments and ending with the pronouncement of judgment. If as a result of prosecution for an offence the trial ends in acquittal, Article 13(a) is not attracted. Constitutional guarantee is available only if the accused is convicted and punished. Thus if the first prosecution results in acquittal, so far as this Article is concerned, the second prosecution is not prohibited. It is, however, open to the Legislature to enlarge the scope of Constitutional guarantee and further extend the protection envisaged by Article 13 (a). Such extension of rule of double jeopardy is to be found in section 403 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The Constitutional guarantee is confined only to duplicate punishment and is silent in so far as acquittal is concerned. Section 403 (1) however prohibits the second trial for an offence during the course of existence of conviction or acquittal of a person, as the same may be in consequence of final adjudication of such an offence by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Thus the rule against "autrefois acquit" finds place in section 403(1) and the counterpart of this rule "autrefois convict" has received recognition in the Constitutional guarantee embodied in Article 13(a).
In the present case one trial ended in conviction and punishment and in the second case accused was acquitted. When the two judgments are placed in juxtaposition it becomes evident that the judgment of conviction in point of time was rendered first and shall hold the field. The accused's subsequent acquittal cannot reflect upon his conviction and sentence awarded to him on the basis of the trial.
Under section 26 of the General Clauses Act there is no bar on the simultaneous prosecution; what is prohibited is duplicate punishment and not the trial.
(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑Art. 13(a)‑‑‑Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 4030)‑‑‑Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302/149‑‑‑Murder‑‑‑Police had sent up for trial two sets of the accused one set consisting of three accused as nominated in the F.I.R. and the other set of four accused after formulating the opinion that they were the men who had committed the murder‑‑‑Name of one accused figures in both the sets‑‑‑Said particular accused was arraigned twice before the Sessions Court and in the case commenced on the strength of F.I.R. he was convicted and sentenced to death but his other trial concluded in the pronouncement of judgment of acquittal‑‑‑Contention of the said accused was that he was vexed twice for one and the same offence which was violative of Constitutional guarantee provided by Art. 13(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan and also in contravention of S.403(1) of Cr.P.C.‑‑‑Held, that proceedings were neither violative of Art. 13(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan nor in contravention of S. 403(1), Cr:P.C.
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