From the bare reading of the provisions of 405 PPC it appears that to constitute an offence falling within the ambit of criminal breach of trust following ingredients are essential

 2022 SCMR 2001

From the bare reading of the provisions of 405 PPC it appears that to constitute an offence falling within the ambit of criminal breach of trust following ingredients are essential:--

(i) There should be an entrustment by a person who reposes confidence in the other, to whom property is entrusted.

(ii) The person in whom the confidence is placed, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use, the property entrusted.

(iii) Dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged.

(iv) Dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any legal contract express or implied which he has made touching the discharge of such trust.

To constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust defined in Section 405 PPC, which is punishable under Section 406 PPC there must be an "entrustment" of property with the accused and a misappropriation of the same by him. The expression "entrustment" with the property or with any domain over the property has been used in a broader sense under Section 405 PPC. It has wide and different implications in different context. The expression "trust" in Section 405 PPC is a comprehensive expression and has been used to denote various types of relationship, like relationship of trustee and beneficiary, bailor and bailee, master and servant, pledger and pledgee. It is established law that while using the inherent powers, the High Court is to determine whether continuance of the proceedings would constitute a gross abuse of the judicial process. Both under the criminal law and civil law remedy can be pursued in diverse situations. Although they plainly overlap, they do not always exclude one another, and essentially vary in both content and impact. An act does not lose its criminal nature just because it has a civil liability.

It is wrongly presumed that when a civil liability is under challenge and its discipline relates to civil remedy, criminal prosecution is unsustainable.

This impression has been clarified by this Court while rendering a number of judgments on this subject. In the instant matter without critically analyzing the scope of quashing of FIR, we are surprised to note that the alternative remedy of filing petition under the law was not availed rather directly filing a Constitution petition calling in question the very registration of FIR was something extraordinary coupled with the fact that the contents of the crime report were totally ignored and were not taken into consideration while adjudicating the matter in hand. The fate of deciding any criminal litigation primarily without recording of evidence seems to be something which has narrow scope. However, this principle is not absolute. In an appropriate case where complete injustice has been done, a Constitutional remedy can be pressed into and that can prove to be beneficial if the contents of the same warrant interference by a Constitutional court. Even otherwise, the legal remedy provided under the statute is based upon two words used by the Legislature i.e. “possibility” and “probability”. Both these words in their entirety are sufficient to provide remedy to a sufferer of criminal litigation if at all it infringes the legal rights of any litigant on the basis of malicious prosecution. In the instant case a bare perusal of the FIR and the agreement to sell prima facie reveals that a clear allegation of entrustment and misappropriation of the property was made by the petitioner against the respondents in the FIR, which prima-facie discloses an offence under Sections 405 PPC punishable under Section 406 PPC. Admittedly, despite lapse of statutory period, the challan had not been submitted before the Trial Court, which ex-facie means that investigation had not been completed. In such circumstances, the possibility cannot be ruled out that further material may be collected for proceeding with trial. In view of the above, we are of the view that question regarding determination as to whether there was an entrustment of property, as asserted by the petitioner, could best be left to Trial Court to consider and decide in exercise of its power after recording of evidence.