2022 LHC 8703
What does the term “sine die” means?
Whether in Sessions trials such an order can be passed or not.?
The term “sine die” is a Latin word not defined anywhere in the Cr.P.C. It is the salutary principle of legal interpretation that if a word or expression is not defined in the Act from which the lis is arising, it is permissible to consult its dictionary meanings.
According to the scheme of things provided in the Cr.P.C, the Sessions trials are to be carried out in consonance with the procedure laid down in Chapter XXII-A. In the above Chapter, there is no express provision whereby a Sessions trial can be adjourned for an indefinite period, without an actual date. Though in Chapter XX of Cr.P.C, an enabling provision of Section 249 is incorporated to adjourn a trial for an indefinite period without pronouncing judgment, but such an order can only be passed by the Magistrate of the First Class. A specific embargo is placed by the Legislature that an order in terms of Section 249 Cr.P.C cannot be passed in respect of a trial stemming out from a complaint case and the foregoing provision is restricted only to the extent of State cases. Moreover, the trial proceedings can be stopped by the Magistrate with the mandatory previous sanction of the Sessions Judge concerned. Even otherwise, Chapter XX of Cr.P.C exclusively pertains to the trial of cases by Magistrate, thus has no applicability upon a trial being conducted by Sessions Court.
The plain review of Section 344 Cr.P.C reveals that even the foregoing provision does not enable the Sessions Court to adjourn the case without any date or for an indefinite period. The use of expression “from time to time” sheds no ambiguity rather manifests that the case can only be adjourned for a specific date and not for an indefinite period. The postponement or adjournment of a case under Section 344 (1) Cr.P.C can be made due to absence of witnesses or for any other reasonable cause. Admittedly, the case in hand was not adjourned sine die due to the absence of witnesses, rather it was owing to the delinquency of co-accused for not surrendering before the police. The question of paramount importance arises that what can be a reasonable cause in terms of Section 344 (1) Cr.P.C and the answer to this query is given in the explanation clause annexed with the foregoing provision.
Section 344 (1) indeed restrains the Sessions Judge to adjourn or postpone the case for an indefinite period. As a matter of fact, Section 344 (1) empowers a Sessions Judge to adjourn the case from time to time and needless to mention for a specific date if it is necessary or advisable. Even otherwise, it explicitly spells out from Section 344 (1) Cr.P.C that the case is to be adjourned for a specific date which appears to be reasonable to the Court.
The expeditious decision of a criminal case is the right of an accused and the pending lis cannot be used as sword of Damocles through a sine die adjournment. In reference to the reason for which order of sine die adjournment was passed, I am of the considered view that the continuation of trial in normal course would have served the ends of justice. As mentioned above, one of the co-accused is still at large and no one can say with certainty that when he will be nabbed by the police. The recording of prosecution evidence will indeed preserve the statements of prosecution witnesses and if someone out of them is not available due to death or for any other reason upon the arrest of absconding co-accused, his deposition will legally be brought on record in terms of Article 47 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.
The language of Article 47 impeccably reveals its relevancy to the view so formed above. Admittedly, the statements of witnesses recorded in the case will come within the definition of “evidence” given in Article 2 (c) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and the “judicial proceedings” mentioned in Section 4 (m) of Cr.P.C. According to Article 2 (c) ibid, evidence includes all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters of fact under inquiry and all documents produced for the inspection of court. Likewise, as per Section 4 (m) ibid, the judicial proceedings include any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. According to Article 47, the evidence given by a witness in judicial proceeding is relevant in a subsequent judicial proceeding between the same parties, if such witness is dead or cannot be found or becomes incapable of giving evidence or is kept out of the way by the adverse party.
Last but not the least, the Courts can only interpret the law for applying it in letter and spirit but run out of jurisdiction for giving a selfdevised meaning or interpretation to a statutory provision which otherwise is not permissible. It will be a fallacious approach to devise a procedural mechanism for the sine die adjournment of the case, more importantly when it goes contrary to the express provision of Section 344 (1) Cr.P.C. Recasting of a procedure by a Court when it has no such power is destined to destroy the legal fabric of the law made by the Parliament. There are four rules of statutory interpretation and first out of them is literal rule, the second golden rule, the third mischief rule and fourth purposive approach. The literal rule enables the Court to interpret the legal provision in its literal and ordinary sense and cannot examine the intent of the Legislature. The golden rule can only be given effect if the literal interpretation gives rise to some irrationality. Under such rule, the Court can look into the legislative intent of a provision or a statute. The third rule of mischief can be used to see the unconstitutionality of the legislation. The purposive rule can be set in motion for ensuring the effectiveness of the law in accordance with the will of Parliament. In the instant case, the rule of literal interpretation is to be followed for ascertaining the legislative wisdom of Section 344 (1) Cr.P.C and it can be held beyond shred of ambiguity that an order of sine die adjournment, that too due to the abscondence of the co-accused, cannot be passed.
With the insertion of Article 10-A in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 through Eighteenth Amendment, the fair trial and due process is the entitlement of every person. The concept of due process rests in the idea that the legal proceedings be carried out in accordance with the established rules, express statutory provisions and settled principles for deciding the rights of litigants.
Crl. Revision-Against Interim Order-PPC
91-22
NADEEM SULTAN ETC VS HAMZA SHAMIM ETC
Mr. Justice Ch. Abdul Aziz
22-07-2022
2022 LHC 8703
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