Few aspects of the case qua, (i) motive, (ii) time of occurrence, (iii) manner of occurrence, and (iv) subsequent events, are essential for their determination to arrive at a just conclusion in the interest of safe administration of criminal justice.

It is cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that each criminal case has its own facts, which has to be dealt with according to its peculiar facts and circumstances. The present case is the glaring example of the same wherein the complainant of this case, who was not the inmate of the house rather was cousin of the deceased Haq Nawaz, had to lodge the crime report when admittedly he was residing six kilometers away from the place of occurrence. Prior to taking into consideration the contents of the crime report, few aspects of the case qua, (i) motive, (ii) time of occurrence, (iii) manner of occurrence, and (iv) subsequent events, are essential for their determination to arrive at a just conclusion in the interest of safe administration of criminal justice. Besides, as per contents of the crime report, the occurrence had taken place at 12:30 am on 13.06.2011 whereas the FIR was lodged at 01:30 am, which clearly reflects that the same was registered without any inordinate delay. Perusal of the crime report reflects that the aforesaid crime report was incorporated in response to Rapat No. 32 dated 13.06.2011, which was lodged in response to an application received by Arif lshaq, ASI/Duty Officer of Police Station Sukheki on 1306.2011. During the course of proceedings before the Trial Court, the complainant Muhammad Bashir (PW-1) stated before the Court that he moved an application (Ex.PA) for registration of case, which bears his signature, without disclosing time and the name of the subscriber of the application. He further stated before the Court that he proceeded towards Police Station on a motorbike along with Muhammad Khan (PW2) and reached there within is minutes after the occurrence i.e. approximately at 01:30 am. It is not mentioned anywhere that where and when this application was drafted when it is an admitted fact that the "Police Karvai" was conducted in Police Station. The whole proceedings narrated by Muhammad Bashir (PW-1) are squarely contradicted by Muhammad Khan (PW-2) as according to him Police arrived at the place of occurrence and completed every aspect of investigation i.e. (i) collection of crime empties, (ii) blood stained earth from both places where deceased were done to death, (iii) recorded statements of PWs including Muhammad Khan (PW-2) at the spot by the Investigating Officer. Muhammad Sahara, Investigating Officer while appearing as PW-11 stated in the court that he visited the place of occurrence and performed "Police Karvai" as per rules. He also assigned Sikandar Hayat, Constable, to escort the dead bodies to mortuary for conducting post-mortem examination. All these statements are contradictory to each other on salient features, which creates dent in the genuineness of prosecution version, especially when it is an admitted fact that complainant is a distant relative residing at a distance of 6 kilometers while real son of deceased namely Arsalan who was inmate of the same house is absent in every material aspect of the case, which is a serious lapse. All this makes it clear that the complainant was not present at the place of occurrence at the relevant time. This Court being the Court to do complete justice under Article 187 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is under bounden duty to scrutinize each and every bit of "crime report". At the same time, it is the duty of this Court to scrutinize other aspects surfaced during the course of proceedings before the Trial Court to decide the lis to avoid any injustice to either of the party. There is no denial to this fact that the occurrence had taken place in the odd hours of the night. However, no source of light has been mentioned by the Investigating Officer either in the FIR, rough site plan, scaled site plan or even during the course of proceedings before the Trial Court.

Article 129 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact, which it thinks likely to have happened with regard to common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.  

It is now well established that if a specific motive has been alleged by the prosecution then it is duty of the prosecution to establish the said motive through cogent and confidence inspiring evidence. Otherwise, the same would go in favour of the accused.

if the crime empty is sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory after the arrest of the accused or together with the crime weapon, the positive report of the said Laboratory looses its evidentiary value. Sending the crime empties together with the weapon of offence is not a safe way to sustain conviction of the accused and it smacks of foul play on the part of the Investigating Officer simply for the reason that till recovery of weapon, he kept the empties with him for no justifiable reason. Blood stained hatchet was also allegedly recovered on the pointation of appellant Allah Ditta from his house after 15 days of the occurrence. Such recovery is not worth believing as it was not expected from the accused to keep blood stained weapon at his house as there was ample time to destroy or washout the said weapon. Even otherwise, admittedly the said house was a joint house wherein the other members of the appellant's family were also residing. In these circumstances, the recoveries are inconsequential.

Mere heinousness of the offence if not proved to the hilt is not a ground to punish an accused. It is an established principle of law and equity that it is better that 100 guilty persons should let off but one innocent person should not suffer. The peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case are sufficient to cast a shadow of doubt on the prosecution case, which entitles the appellants to the right of benefit of the doubt. It is a well settled principle of law that for the accused to be afforded this right of the benefit of the doubt, it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating uncertainty and if there is only one doubt, the benefit of the same must go to the accused. 