PLJ 2026 Cr.C. 106
[Sindh High Court Circuit Court Hyderabad]
Present: Riazat Ali Sahar, J.
FAYYAZ AHMED and others--Appellants
versus
STATE--Respondent
Crl. A. No. S-162 of 2024, decided on 26.5.2025.
Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (XI of 2005)--
دفعہ 3 (2)-کسی شخص کو کسی جائیداد میں داخل ہونے یا اس پر قبضہ کرنے سے منع کرتا ہے - - یہ خصوصی قانون طاقت ور افراد کی بڑھتی ہوئی لعنت کو روکنے کے لیے نافذ کیا گیا تھا جو دوسروں کی املاک پر زبردستی قبضہ کر رہے ہیں - ایکٹ کی دفعہ 3 غیر قانونی بے دخلی کا جرم بناتی ہے - دفعہ 3 کی ذیلی دفعہ (1) واضح طور پر کسی شخص کو کسی بھی جائیداد میں داخل ہونے یا اس پر قبضہ کرنے ، قبضہ کرنے ، کنٹرول کرنے یا اس پر قبضہ کرنے سے منع کرتی ہے "ایسا کرنے کا کوئی قانونی اختیار حاصل کیے بغیر" ، اگر ارادہ جائز مالک یا قابض کو بے دخل کرنا ہے ۔ دوسرے لفظوں میں ، قانون اس معاملے میں مبینہ طرز عمل کو بالکل نشانہ بناتا ہے: کسی اور کی جائیداد پر زبردستی ، غیر مجاز قبضہ - - سیکشن 3 کے ذیلی سیکشن (2) پھر سزا کا تعین کرتا ہے ، جس میں دس سال کی قید ، جرمانے کے ساتھ ، اور متاثرہ کو معاوضہ ادا کرنے کی ہدایت کے ساتھ (سیکشن 544-اے ، ضابطہ فوجداری کے مطابق) اس طرح ، ایکٹ کی دفعہ 3 (2) کے تحت سزا کو محفوظ بنانے کے لیے ، استغاثہ کو یہ ثابت کرنا چاہیے کہ (1) شکایت کنندہ مالک یا جائز قابض تھا اور زیر بحث جائیداد کا قبضہ تھا ، اور (2) وہ ملزم شخص ، بغیر کسی قانونی اختیار کے ، جائیداد میں داخل ہوا اور شکایت کنندہ کو زبردستی بے دخل کر دیا-یہ ضروری نہیں ہے کہ ملزم بدنام زمانہ "زمین پر قبضہ کرنے والا" ہو یا کسی منظم گروہ کا حصہ ہو ؛ کوئی بھی شخص جو دفعہ 3 (1) میں بیان کردہ عمل کا ارتکاب کرتا ہے وہ ذمہ دار ہے ۔
----S. 3(2)--Prohibits any person from entering into or upon any property to dispossess-- This special enactment was promulgated to curb rising menace of powerful individuals forcibly usurping others’ property--Section 3 of Act creates offence of illegal dispossession--Sub-section (1) of Section 3 expressly prohibits any person from entering into or upon any property to dispossess, grab, control or occupy it “without having any lawful authority to do so”, if intention is to dispossess lawful owner or occupier--In other words, law targets exactly kind of conduct alleged in this case: a forcible, unauthorized takeover of someone else’s property--Sub-section (2) of Section 3 then prescribes punishment, which may extend to ten years’ imprisonment, with fine, and with a direction to pay compensation to victim (in accordance with Section 544-A, Cr.P.C.)--Thus, to secure a conviction under Section 3(2) of Act, prosecution must establish (i) that complainant was an owner or lawful occupier and in possession of property in question, and (ii) that accused person, without any lawful authority, entered property and forcibly dispossessed complainant--It is not necessary that accused be a notorious “land grabber” or part of any organized group; any person who commits act described in Section 3(1) is liable.
[Pp. 112 & 113] A
2005 CLC 83.
Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (XI of 2005)--
دفعہ 3 (2)-مجرمانہ طریقہ کار کوڈ ، 1898 (1898 کا V) ایس ایس ۔ 22--اے اور 22-بی -زبانی ثبوت-زبانی ثبوت کے علاوہ ، کافی حالات اور سرکاری ثبوت موجود ہیں جو استغاثہ کی کہانی کو مزید یقین دلاتے ہیں - - یہ غیر متنازعہ ہے کہ واقعے کے فورا بعد ، شکایت کنندہ نے بادن میں سیشن کورٹ سے رجوع کرکے قانون نافذ کرنے کی کوشش کی (سیکشن 22-اے اور 22-بی ، ضابطہ فوجداری) چونکہ مقامی پولیس نے اس کی ایف آئی آر درج کرنے سے انکار کر دیا تھا-اگرچہ اس درخواست کو براہ راست شکایت درج کرنے کی آزادی کے ساتھ نمٹا دیا گیا تھا ، لیکن شکایت کنندہ کی طرف سے قانونی علاج کا فوری سہارا لینے کی حقیقت اس تجویز کی تردید کرتی ہے کہ یہ مقدمہ بعد میں سوچا گیا تھا یا من گھڑت تھا - اس کے علاوہ ، پری کوگنیزنس مرحلے پر سیکھے ہوئے سیشن جج کی ہدایات کے مطابق ، غیر قانونی بے دخلی کے دعووں کی تصدیق کے لیے جوڈیشل مجسٹریٹ (پی ڈبلیو-6) کے ذریعے ایک آزاد تحقیقات کی گئی ۔ - درحقیقت ، جیسا کہ ٹرائل کورٹ کے فیصلے میں ذکر کیا گیا ہے ، مجسٹریٹ کی رپورٹ "اپیل گزاروں کے خلاف الزامات کی تصدیق کرتی ہے" ۔ دفاع کے پاس پی ڈبلیو-6 سے جرح کرنے کا موقع تھا ، لیکن اس کے نتائج کو کمزور کرنے کے لیے کوئی ٹھوس چیز سامنے نہیں آئی - - ان سے چند عمومی سوالات پوچھے گئے (مثال کے طور پر ، ریونیو حکام کو اسپاٹ پر بلانے کے طریقہ کار کے بارے میں) لیکن ان کی رپورٹ میں کوئی تضاد یا تعصب ظاہر نہیں ہوا - - اس طرح ، جوڈیشل مجسٹریٹ کی طرف سے ایک غیر جانبدار عہدیدار کی طرف سے آزادانہ تحقیقات استغاثہ کے مقدمے کی نمایاں طور پر حمایت کرتی ہے-یہ اس بات کی تصدیق کرتی ہے کہ ، امکانات کے توازن پر ، شکایت کنندہ قبضے میں تھا اور اپیل گزاروں کے ذریعہ اسے زبردستی بے دخل کر دیا گیا تھا - - یہ آزاد تصدیق دفاع کی اس دلیل کو صاف طور پر مسترد کرتی ہے کہ مقدمہ دشمنی سے پیدا ہونے والی ایک سازش تھی ۔
----S. 3(2)--Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898), Ss. 22-A & 22-B--Oral evidence--In addition to oral evidence, there is considerable circumstantial and official evidence which lends further assurance to prosecution story--It is undisputed that shortly after incident, complainant attempted to invoke law by approaching Session Court at Badin (under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C.) since local police refused to register his FIR--Although that application was disposed of with liberty to file a direct complaint, fact of complainant’s prompt resort to legal remedies negates suggestion that this case was an afterthought or fabricated--Moreover, pursuant to learned Session Judge’s directions at pre-cognizance stage, an independent inquiry was conducted by a Judicial Magistrate (PW-6) to verify claims of illegal dispossession-- Indeed, as noted in trial Court’s judgment, Magistrate’s report “substantiated allegations against appellants.” The defence had opportunity to cross-examine PW-6, but nothing substantial emerged to undermine his conclusions--He was asked a few general questions (for example, about procedure of calling revenue officials to spot), but no contradiction or bias in his report was demonstrated--Thus, independent inquiry by a Judicial Magistrate an impartial official significantly supports prosecution case--It confirms that, on a balance of probabilities, complainant was in possession and was forcibly dispossessed by appellants--This independent corroboration flatly belies defence’s contention that case was a concoction borne out of enmity. [Pp. 116 & 117] B & C
Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (XI of 2005)--
دفعہ 3 (2)-یہ طے شدہ قانون ہے کہ ایسے حالات کسی شخص کو اضافی عدالتی طور پر بے دخل کرنے کا کوئی لائسنس نہیں دیتے ہیں-غیر قانونی قبضہ قانون جائیداد پر کسی بھی سول قانونی چارہ جوئی کے باوجود کام کرتا ہے ۔
----S. 3(2)--It is settled law that such circumstances do not grant any license to dispossess a person extra judicially--The Illegal Dispossession Act operates notwithstanding any civil litigation over property. [P. 118] D
PLD 2007 Lahore 231 & PLD 2010 SC 661.
Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (XI of 2005)--
ایس۔ 3 (2)-ایک قابض کو بے دخل کریں - اگر غیر قانونی بے دخلی کا جرم انجام دیا جاتا ہے ، تو مجرم محض شہری دعوے یا دشمنی کی طرف اشارہ کرکے جواب دہی سے بچ نہیں سکتا ۔ - موجودہ کیس واضح طور پر اس بات کی وضاحت کرتا ہے کہ قانون ایک حقیقی مالک سے بھی قانونی عمل (فرمان پر عمل درآمد وغیرہ) کے ذریعے بے دخلی کی درخواست کرنے کی توقع کیوں کرتا ہے ۔ ) بروٹ فورس کے بجائے - سپریم کورٹ نے صدیوں پرانے اس اصول کی بار بار توثیق کی ہے کہ "کسی کو بھی قانون اپنے ہاتھ میں لینے کی اجازت نہیں ہے" ؛ یہاں تک کہ ایک زمیندار یا مالک کو بھی کسی قابض کو بے دخل کرنے کے لیے قانون کے مطابق عمل کرنا چاہیے ، اور ایسا کرنے کی کوئی بھی زبردستی کوشش غیر قانونی ہے ۔
----S. 3(2)--Dispossess an occupier--If an offence of illegal dispossession is committed, perpetrator cannot evade accountability merely by pointing to a civil claim or rivalry--The present case starkly illustrates why law expects even a true owner to seek eviction through legal process (execution of a decree, etc.), rather than by brute force--The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed age-old principle that “no one is allowed to take law into his own hands”; even a landlord or owner must follow due course of law to dispossess an occupier, and any forcible attempt to do so is illegal.
[P. 118] E
2001 SCMR 1700.
Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (XI of 2005)--
دفعہ 3 (2)-- ملکیت کی بحالی-- "گابا گروہ"-- - اگر اس طرح کا کوئی عمل کیا جاتا ہے ، تو متاثرہ شخص ملکیت کی بحالی کا حقدار ہے اور مجرم سزا کا ذمہ دار ہے - - اس طرح ، اپیل کنندگان کی شکایت کہ تنازعہ "سول نوعیت کا تھا" غلط ہے ؛ قانون کو اپنے ہاتھ میں لینے کے ان کے طرز عمل نے ایکٹ کی تعزیراتی دفعات کو اپنی طرف متوجہ کیا-دوسری طرف ، یہ دعوی کیا گیا (واضح طور پر ، "زمین پر قبضہ کرنے والوں" کی اصطلاح کا حوالہ دیتے ہوئے) کہ مقننہ کا ارادہ منظم قبزہ گروہوں کو نشانہ بنانا تھا ، نہ کہ عام پڑوسیوں یا اپیل کنندگان جیسے افراد کو - - اس تنازعہ کو سیکشن 3 کی زبان اور کیس لاء کے ذریعہ واضح طور پر مسترد کیا گیا ہے - قانون میں مجرم کو بیان کرنے کے لیے "کوئی نہیں" اور "جو بھی" الفاظ استعمال کیے گئے ہیں ، جو عالمگیریت کی نشاندہی کرتے ہیں ۔
----S. 3(2)--Restoration of possession--”Gabza Groups”--If such such an act is done, victim is entitled to restoration of possession and wrongdoer is liable to punishment--Thus, appellants grievance that dispute was “of civil nature” is misplaced; their very conduct of taking law into their own hands attracted penal provisions of Act--Secondly, it was contended (implicitly, by referring to term “land grabbers”) that legislature’s intent was to target organized qabza groups, not ordinary neighbors or individuals like appellants--This contention is expressly negated by language of Section 3 and by case-law--The statute uses words “no one” and “whoever” to describe offender, indicating universality. [P. 118] F
2009 SCMR 1066 & 2010 SCMR 1254.
Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (XI of 2005)--
دفعہ 3 (2)-کسی بھی جائز مالک یا قبضہ کرنے والے کو موثر ریلیف - غیر قانونی قبضہ قانون کسی بھی جائز مالک یا قبضہ کرنے والے کو موثر راحت فراہم کرتا ہے جسے قانونی اختیار کے بغیر کسی کے ذریعہ بے دخل کیا گیا ہو ، چاہے مجرم کی حیثیت یا شناخت کچھ بھی ہو ۔ اس سے پہلے کے کچھ فیصلوں میں ایکٹ کے اطلاق کو صرف بدنام زمانہ زمینی مافیا سے متعلق مقدمات تک محدود کرنے کی کوشش کو سپریم کورٹ نے مسترد کر دیا تھا ، جس نے اس طرح کی پابندیوں کو اچھا قانون قرار نہیں دیا تھا ۔ مختصرا ، کوئی بھی شخص جو سیکشن 3 (1) میں بیان کردہ عمل کا ارتکاب کرتا ہے جیسا کہ اپیلوں نے یہاں کیا ہے وہ ایکٹ کے تحت ذمہ دار ہے ۔ ذاتی یا بین خاندانی جھگڑوں کے لیے کوئی رعایت نہیں ہے - - موجودہ اپیل کنندگان ، اگرچہ روایتی معنوں میں شاید "پیشہ ور اراضی پر قبضہ کرنے والے" نہیں ہیں ، اس کے باوجود انہوں نے بالکل وہی نقصان پہنچایا ہے جس کا قانون ازالہ کرنا چاہتا ہے: انہوں نے گھر کے جائز مکینوں کو پرتشدد اور غیر قانونی طور پر بے دخل کر دیا ۔ - اس لیے ان کے خلاف جرم کے تمام اجزاء ثابت ہو گئے - ٹرائل کورٹ نے ایکٹ کی دفعہ 3 (2) کے تحت اپیلوں کو صحیح طور پر مجرم قرار دیا ، اور اس عدالت کو ، پورے شواہد اور حالات کی دوبارہ تشخیص کرنے پر ، اس سزا میں کوئی قانونی یا حقیقت پسندانہ کمزوری نہیں ملتی ہے ۔
----S. 3(2)--Efficious relief to any lawful owner or occupier dispossessed--The Illegal Dispossession Act provides efficacious relief to any lawful owner or occupier dispossessed by anyone without lawful authority, irrespective of status or identity of perpetrator--The attempt in some earlier judgments to limit Act’s application only to cases involving notorious land mafias was deprecated by Supreme Court, which declared such restrictions as not good law--In short, any person who commits act described in Section 3(1) as appellants did here is liable under Act There is no exemption for personal or inter-family squabbles--The present appellants, though perhaps not “professional land grabbers” in conventional sense, have nonetheless perpetrated exactly harm which law seeks to redress: they violently and illegally dispossessed lawful occupants of a house--Therefore, all ingredients of offence stood proved against them--The trial Court rightly convicted appellants under Section 3(2) of Act, and this Court, upon re-appraisal of entire evidence and circumstances, finds no legal or factual infirmity in that conviction. [P. 119] G
Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (XI of 2005)--
دفعہ 3 (2)-کسی شخص کو کسی جائیداد میں داخل ہونے یا اس پر قبضہ کرنے سے منع کرتا ہے - سزا اور سزا-غیر قانونی قبضہ قانون ، 2005 کی دفعہ 3 (2) کے تحت اپیل گزاروں کی سزا کو برقرار رکھا جاتا ہے اور اس حد تک ان کی اپیل کو مسترد کر دیا جاتا ہے ۔ کیس کے انتہائی حقائق کو دیکھتے ہوئے ، ہر اپیل کنندہ کو دی گئی پانچ سال کی سخت قید کی سزا کو سخت یا حد سے زیادہ نہیں کہا جا سکتا ۔ یہ اس طرح کے سنگین جرم کے لیے قانون کے ذریعہ مقرر کردہ سزا (جس کی مدت دس سال تک ہے) کے اندر اچھی طرح سے آتا ہے ۔ - تاہم ، یہ عدالت کے نوٹس میں لایا گیا کہ اپیل کنندگان پہلے ہی سزا کے کافی حصے سے گزر چکے ہیں - اپیل گزاروں نے مؤثر طریقے سے حراست کی سزا کی مکمل لمبائی سے گزرا ہے ، عدالت اس وجہ سے انہیں مزید قید میں رہنے کا مطالبہ کرنا غیر ضروری اور غیر منصفانہ سمجھتی ہے ۔ سزا اور جرمانے اور معاوضے کی سزاؤں کو برقرار رکھتے ہوئے ، اپیل کنندگان کی قید کی سزاؤں میں اس حد تک ترمیم کی گئی ہے کہ وہ پہلے سے گزر چکی مدت تک کم ہو جائیں ۔ - مندرجہ بالا ترمیم کے علاوہ ، ٹرائل کورٹ کے متنازعہ فیصلے کو مکمل طور پر برقرار رکھا جاتا ہے - اپیل کنندگان حراست میں ہیں ؛ یہ سمجھا جاتا ہے کہ انہوں نے قید کے مقصد سے اپنی سزا پوری کی ہے ، اور ٹرائل کورٹ کے ذریعہ مقرر کردہ جرمانے اور معاوضے کی رقم کی ادائیگی کے بعد فوری طور پر رہا کیا جائے گا ، اگر کسی دوسرے معاملے میں اس کی ضرورت نہ ہو ۔ مزید برآں ، سینئر سپرنٹنڈنٹ آف پولیس (ایس ایس پی) اے بادن کو غیر قانونی قبضہ ایکٹ-2005 کی دفعہ 8 کے تحت ہدایت کی گئی ہے کہ وہ اس بات کو یقینی بنائے کہ متعلقہ جائیداد کا قبضہ شکایت کنندہ بھانو کے حوالے کیا جائے ، اس فیصلے کی تاریخ سے دو (2) ہفتوں کی مدت کے اندر ۔ - اپیل کو ٹرائل کورٹ کے ذریعے سنائی گئی سزا میں ترمیم کے ساتھ خارج کر دیا جاتا ہے ۔
----S. 3(2)--Prohibits any person from entering into or upon any property to dispossess--Conviction and sentence--The conviction of appellants under Section 3(2) of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is upheld and their appeal to that extent is dismissed--Given egregious facts of case, sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment awarded to each appellant cannot be termed harsh or excessive; it falls well within punishment prescribed by law (which extends up to ten years) for such a grave offence--However, it was brought to Court’s notice that appellants have already undergone a substantial portion of sentence--The appellants have effectively undergone full length of custodial sentence, Court considers it unnecessary and unjust to require them to remain incarcerated any further on this account--While maintaining conviction and sentences of fine and compensation, appellants’ sentences of imprisonment are modified to extent of being reduced to period already undergone by them-- Except for above modification, impugned judgment of trial Court is maintained in entirety--The appellants are in custody; they are deemed to have served out their sentences for purpose of imprisonment, and shall be released forthwith after payment of amount of fine and compensation as fixed by trial Court, if not required in any other case--Furthermore, senior Superintendent of Police (SSP)A Badin is hereby directed under Section 8, Illegal Dispossession Act--2005 to ensure that possession of subject property is handed over to complainant, namely Bhano, within a period of two (2) weeks from date of this judgement--The appeal is dismissed with modification in sentence awarded by trial Court. [Pp. 119 & 120] H, I & J
M/s. Meer M. Buriro and Malik Bux Mari, Advocates for Appellants.
Mr. Wali Khan, Advocate for Complainant.
Mr. Altaf Hussain Khokhar, Deputy Prosecutor General for State.
Date of hearing: 28.4.2025.
Judgment
Through the instant Criminal Appeal, the appellants call into question the legality, propriety, and correctness of the judgment dated 14.12.2024, delivered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Matli, in I.D. Complaint No. 10 of 2019. By virtue of the said judgment, the appellants have been Convicted under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) for a period of five years. In addition to the custodial sentence, the appellants were each directed to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/-, and in default thereof, to further suffer simple imprisonment (S.I.) for six months. Furthermore, the learned trial Court also directed the appellants to pay compensation of Rs. 50,000/- each to the complainant within thirty (30) days from the date of the order. The appellants, being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and the sentences imposed therein, seek appropriate relief from this Honourable Court through the present appeal.
2. Succinctly stated, the facts of the case, as narrated in the complaint, are that the complainant initiated proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, alleging that he was unlawfully dispossessed from his residential premises by the appellants-namely Fayaz, Farman, Ahsan, and Shahid-who reside adjacent to him. It was asserted that the appellants had previously made multiple attempts to dispossess him, and that on 10.03.2019, while returning from the market, the complainant was intercepted near the AataChaki of Haji Photo by the said appellants. He was allegedly assaulted, his hands tied, and forcibly taken to his residence, where three other accused-Hussain Sheedi, Khair Muhammad, and Shabir Jaskani-were already present. The complainant further alleged that, with the aid of certain police officials, the appellants unlawfully entered his home. physically assaulted his wife and son, tied their hands, and threw out household belongings, including furniture and fabrics, into the street. It was further stated that gold jewellery valued at Rs. 150,000/- and a licensed pistol were taken from his almirah. After being released from the alleged illegal confinement, the complainant and his family sought refuge at the residence of his brother-in-law in Matli. Subsequently, he filed an application under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. before the Sessions Judge, Badin, which was disposed of with a direction to seek remedy under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, pursuant to which the present complaint was instituted.
3. Upon the filing of the complaint, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Matli, directed the Mukhtiarkar of Taluka Matli and the Station House Officer (SHO) of Police Station Tando Ghulam Ali to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the matter and submit their respective reports. Pursuant to the said directions, both officials submitted their reports; however, the complainant raised serious objections thereto, alleging bias and lack of impartiality. He consequently requested that an independent and impartial inquiry be conducted by the concerned Judicial Magistrate. Acceding to the request, an inquiry was entrusted to the Magistrate, who, after examining the facts and evidence, submitted his detailed report dated 15.05.2019. Upon careful consideration of the contents of this report, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Matli, found sufficient material to proceed and accordingly took cognizance of the matter against the appellants/accused under the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, vide order dated 12.07.2019.
4. After providing necessary documents to the appellants/accused, a charge was framed against them as, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed their trial vide their respective pleas.
5. At the trial, the evidence of PWs Bhano (complainant). Suneel, Shr. Beena, Riaz Hussain Rind (Inspector). Anwar Ali Hingorjo (Mukhtiarkar), Aadil Hayat Sandhu (the then Civil Judge & JM-II Matli) was recorded, who produced various documents during their evidence. Thereafter, prosecution side was closed.
6. After evidence, the statements under Section 342, Cr.P.C. of the accused were recorded as, wherein they pleaded their innocence and denied the prosecution allegations. Neither they examined themselves on oath, nor produced any witness in their defence.
7. After formulating the points for determination, recording evidence of the prosecution witnesses and hearing the learned Counsel for the respective parties, the learned trial Court. vide impugned judgment, convicted and sentenced the appellants as referred in paragraph-1 (supra).
8. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the appellants/accused have preferred this criminal appeal with prayer to acquit them by setting aside the impugned judgment.
9. The learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the judgment of the learned trial Court on multiple grounds. arguing that it is contrary to the settled principles of law, devoid of proper appreciation of evidence, and against the norms of justice and equity. He submitted that the trial Court failed to duly consider the material contradictions and discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the inconsistencies between the ocular account and the medical evidence, which render the prosecution’s version unreliable. Furthermore, the counsel asserted that the complainant failed to adduce credible and unimpeachable evidence to substantiate his claim of lawful possession or ownership of the subject property. He emphasized that no credible evidence was brought on record to demonstrate that any physical assault was actually inflicted upon the complainant by the appellants, and the allegations in the complaint are borne out of longstanding enmity and animosity due to a protracted property dispute. Additionally, it was contended that the learned trial Court placed undue reliance on the report of the Judicial Magistrate, which, though part of the record, could not independently suffice to establish the culpability of the appellants without corroborative evidence. The report, it was argued, is based merely on conjecture and cannot, in isolation, form the basis of a conviction. The counsel concluded that the complainant entirely failed to discharge the burden of proving dispossession as envisaged under the Illegal Dispossession Act. 2005, and therefore the appellants are entitled to acquittal.
10. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent/ complainant has vehemently opposed the instant appeal, asserting that the learned trial Court has rendered a well-reasoned and speaking judgment, which has been passed in accordance with law and upon proper appraisal of the evidence available on record. He submitted that the respondent had initially approached the Sessions Court by filing a Criminal Miscellaneous Application under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C., which was disposed of vide order dated 15.04.2022, whereby the complainant was granted liberty to file a direct complaint under Section 200, Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the complainant instituted the complaint, which was registered as Illegal Dispossession Complaint No. 10 of 2019. Learned counsel further contended that the complainant is the rightful owner and lawful possessor of the subject property, which he inherited from his deceased mother and had been peacefully occupying for over 25 years. The unlawful and aggressive conduct of the appellant including illegal entry, use of criminal force, threats, and removal of household belongings--squarely attracted the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. He pointed out that the matter was impartially investigated by a learned Magistrate, whose inquiry report corroborated the complainant’s stance and substantiated the allegations against the appellants. Moreover, the complainant supported his case with documentary evidence regarding title and possession, which remained unrebutted. In light of the overwhelming oral and documentary evidence produced before the trial Court, the conviction of the appellants was justified. The learned counsel, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the present appeal and for the judgment of the trial Court to be upheld in its entirety.
11. Learned DPG has adopted the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the complainant.
12. Heard. Record perused
13. Before proceeding to analyse the evidence, it is pertinent to recapitulate the scope of the offence and the legal ingredients that must be proved under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. This special enactment was promulgated to curb the rising menace of powerful individuals forcibly usurping others’ property. Section 3 of the Act creates the offence of illegal dispossession. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 expressly prohibits any person from entering into or upon any property to dispossess, grab, control or occupy it “without having any lawful authority to do so”, if the intention is to dispossess the lawful owner or occupier. In other words, the law targets exactly the kind of conduct alleged in this case: a forcible, unauthorized takeover of someone else’s property. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 then prescribes the punishment, which may extend to ten years’ imprisonment, with fine, and with a direction to pay compensation to the victim (in accordance with Section 544-A, Cr.P.C.). Thus, to secure a conviction under Section 3(2) of the Act, the prosecution must establish (i) that the complainant was an owner or lawful occupier and in possession of the property in question, and (ii) that the accused person, without any lawful authority, entered the property and forcibly dispossessed the complainant. It is not necessary that the accused be a notorious “land grabber” or part of any organized group; any person who commits the act described in Section 3(1) is liable. Indeed, in Madrassa Darul Fazal Halani v. Muhammad Ramzan Kashmiri (2005 CLC 83). this Court emphasized that continuous prior possession of the aggrieved person and a subsequent unlawful dispossession are the sine qua non for invoking the Act. With these legal benchmarks in mind, the evidence and arguments in the present case are examined below.
14. The complainant (PW-1) has consistently maintained that he was in settled possession of the subject house until the appellants unlawfully ousted him. The record bears out that the complainant’s late mother. Mst. Raami, was the allottee of the plot (measuring 2500 square feet in Ward No. 6, Tando Ghulam Ali) under the Sindh Goth Abad Scheme. The complainant, being her heir, resided in that house along with his family for decades. He produced a copy of the Sanad (allotment certificate) issued by the revenue authorities in his mother’s name (Ex.03/A) to evidence their title and entitlement. It appears that the complainant’s family had built and occupied a house on this plot since long; he testified that he was born in that very house and lived there ever since. The fact that the complainant did not hold the title in his own name is immaterial in the context of this offence--what matters is that he was the lawful occupier in possession. On this point, the defence has been unable to rebut or shake the prosecution’s evidence. The appellants, for their part, asserted (in cross-examination suggestions) that the “subject house belongs to the mother of accused Fayaz”, but tellingly they produced no title document, tenancy agreement or any evidence whatsoever to substantiate that claim. In contrast, the complainant’s documentation of title (albeit in his mother’s name) and long-standing possession remained unrebutted on record. Thus, the complainant amply proved that he was in lawful possession of the house immediately prior to the incident. Having established this, the crucial question is whether the appellants dispossessed him in the manner alleged. After careful scrutiny, this question too must be answered in the affirmative for the reasons that follow.
15. The ocular account of the incident is provided by the complainant (PW-1) himself, corroborated in material particulars by his son (PW-2) and wife (PW-3). These witnesses appeared in Court, under oath, and recounted in vivid detail how on the morning of 10.03.2019 the appellants carried out a violent takeover of the house. The complainant (PW-1) testified that around 10:00 a.m. that day, while he was on his way to purchase groceries, four of the appellants--namely Fayyaz, Ahsan, Shahid. and Farman (who are real brothers and incidentally his adjacent neighbours)-accosted him near the “Aata Chakki of Haji Photo” and declared that they had warned him before, but “now they will not spare me”. Without any provocation, these appellants began beating him with kicks and fists, dragged him off the road towards his house, and tied his hands and gagged his mouth with rope. He was forced into his own house, where the other three accused (Khair Muhammad Jat, ShabbirJiskani and Hussain Sheedi) were already present, evidently lying in wait. Once inside, all the accused launched a fresh bout of assault. PW-1 deposed that he was mercilessly thrashed--hit with fists, kicks and even *lathis* (sticks) seized from his home-while bound and helpless. Hearing the commotion, the complainant’s wife (PW-3) rushed to the scene, only to be set upon by the intruders: she was beaten with kicks and fists as she tried to intervene. Shortly thereafter, the complainant’s adult son, PW-2 (who had been asleep in another room) awoke to the noise and came out, whereupon he found his father tied up and his mother being beaten by the assailants, PW-2 stated that he attempted to rescue his parents, but the assailants overpowered him as well, tying his hands and feet with ropes and knocking him to the ground. At this point, as all three family members lay at the appellants’ mercy, appellant Fayyaz made a phone call summoning reinforcement.
16. The description of what transpired next is both shocking and indicative of a premeditated scheme. In response to Fayyaz’s call, several armed men arrived to assist the appellants. According to the witnesses, among those who joined were co-accused WHC (Head Constable) Bhai Khan Mangrio, ASI Meer Muhammad Chandio, one Nadir Bhurgari, and other unknown persons carrying hatchets. Disturbingly, these included local police officials (in uniform) who sided with the appellants. PW-2 and PW-3 both testified that once these reinforcements gathered. “they all detained us” (the complainant’s family) and systematically ransacked the house. The appellants and their accomplices broke the household furniture, appliances and fixtures, and threw the belongings out onto the street. The family’s 40-inch television was smashed and discarded. The intruders then forced open an iron almirah (cupboard) inside the house and looted valuables kept therein--including cash of Rs. 150,000 (earnings of the complainant’s son), approximately 3½ tolas of gold jewellery, and a licensed 30-bore pistol with 25 live rounds. PW-2 corroborated that he witnessed the private appellants pillaging the cash and gold from the broken almirah, while the police personnel seized the family’s mobile phones (five in total) from their persons. Having thus stripped the house of moveable property, the appellants finally ordered the complainant’s family to get out. PW-1 stated that after the looting. the private accused exited the house, upon which the police officials (ASI Meer Muhammad and WHC Bhai Khan) untied the complainant, his wife and son--but only to menace them with further harm. These police co-accused warned the complainant’s family in no uncertain terms that they must “leave the house and the village” immediately, or else face being “half-fried” (a colloquial reference to severe police brutality or staged encounter). Fearing for their lives after this dire threat, the complainant and his wife and son had no choice but to abandon their home on the spot. The accused thus succeeded in taking over possession of the house; as PW-3 observed, by the time the complainant’s family was untied and forced to flee, the appellants had already occupied the premises, effectively ousting the rightful residents. Traumatized and dispossessed, the complainant’s family fled to Matli town that very day, took refuge with relatives, obtained medical first aid for their injuries, and raised alarm about the incident (including holding a press conference to draw attention to their plight). There is no cogent rebuttal to this harrowing narrative. All three eye-witnesses (PW-1, 2 and 3) were subjected to cross-examination at length, but their core account of an illegal dispossession by force could not be shaken. They each confidently identified all the appellants in Court as the culprits and affirmed that none of the attackers had any lawful authority to enter or take their house. The minor discrepancies that the defence attempted to elicit do not undermine their credibility in any significant way (these are discussed shortly). On all essential points--the fact that the appellants, armed and in concert, assaulted the family and drove them out of their home on 10.03.2019-the witnesses stood firm and remained consistent with one another.
17. The defence counsel highlighted certain perceived contradictions and omissions in the prosecution evidence, but, in the Court’s view, these are neither material nor sufficient to cast doubt on the overall truthfulness of the witnesses. For instance, the appellants pointed out that the complainant’s written application (complaint) did not mention that appellant Fayyaz made a phone call to summon police officials, or that a television set was broken during the incident. It is true that some details which emerged in the oral testimony were not explicitly stated in the initial complaint. However, such minor omissions or improvements are not unusual, especially when the written complaint is a concise account. They do not detract from the substance of the allegation-which was clearly that the accused persons, with the help of others, forcibly dispossessed the complainant by violence. The complainant (PW-1) credibly explained that any discrepancy between the complaint and his later testimony (for example, the exact location where the almirah was opened or the fact that his mouth was sealed with a cloth) was due to either oversight or typographical mistakes in drafting the complaint. Importantly, the defence did not challenge the occurrence of the invasion and dispossession itself in any not detract from the overall coherent and convincing account provided by the prosecution witnesses. The trial Court was, therefore, justified in finding the eye-witnesses to be reliable. This Court, on re-appraisal, finds no reason to take a divergent view on their credibility.
18. In addition to the oral evidence, there is considerable circumstantial and official evidence which lends further assurance to the prosecution story. It is undisputed that shortly after the incident, the complainant attempted to invoke the law by approaching the Session Court at Badin (under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C.) since the local police refused to register his FIR. Although that application was disposed of with liberty to file a direct complaint, the fact of the complainant’s prompt resort to legal remedies negates the suggestion that this case was an afterthought or fabricated. Moreover, pursuant to the learned Session Judge’s directions at the pre-cognizance stage, an independent inquiry was conducted by a Judicial Magistrate (PW-6) to verify the claims of illegal dispossession. PW-6. Mr. Aadil Hayat Sandhu (Civil Judge & JM-II, Matli at the time). appeared and testified that he carried out a thorough spot inquiry on 06.05.2019, as per the orders of the Sessions Judge. He visited the locality of the house along with revenue officials, inspected the site, and recorded statements of local inhabitants (namely one Mao, one Aamir and one Muhammad Haroon). After completing the inspection and considering the information gathered, PW-6 submitted a detailed Inquiry Report dated 15.05.2019 (Exhibits 08/A to 08/D) to the Court. In his examination-in-chief. PW-6 verified that the report and the residents statements annexed were true and correct. Although the report itself was not read out in full during testimony, the complainant’s counsel emphasised (and PW-6 confirmed) that the findings of the Magistrate’s inquiry corroborated the complainant’s version of eventy. Indeed, as noted in the trial Court’s judgment, the Magistrate’s report “substantiated the allegations against the appellants.” The defence had the opportunity to cross-examine PW-6, but nothing substantial emerged to undermine his conclusions. He was asked a few general questions (for example, about the procedure of calling revenue officials to the spot), but no contradiction or bias in his report was demonstrated. Thus, the independent inquiry by a Judicial Magistrate--an impartial official--significantly supports the prosecution case. It confirms that, on a balance of probabilities, the complainant was in possession and was forcibly dispossessed by the appellants. This independent corroboration flatly belies the defence’s contention that the case was a concoction borne out of enmity.
19. The Court has also considered the testimony of PW-4, Inspector Riaz Hussain Rind (the then SHO of P.S. Tando Ghulam Ali), which was relied upon by the defence. PW-4’s version of events, however, does little to assist the appellants. By his own admission, the SHO did not witness the incident; rather, he arrived afterwards and largely repeated what one of the accused (ASI Meer Muhammad) reported to him. According to PW-4, ASI Meer Muhammad telephonically informed him that “accused Fayaz Ahmed & others and complainant Bhanoo have quarrelled with each other”, and that when police reached the spot they found household articles scattered and both parties women fighting, but that everyone dispersed on seeing the police. The SHO further stated that later the same day a local notable attempted to mediate and, eventually, a counter FIR (apparently lodged by appellant Fayyaz’s side) was registered against the complainant. under sections 457 and 506, PPC. This version put forth by PW-4 is clearly a hearsay account and was rightly not accorded weight by the trial Court. It is abundantly clear that PW-4 was testifying in line with what his subordinate officers (who are themselves accused in this case) had claimed. Given that two police officials (ASI Meer Muhammad and WHC Bhai Khan) were actively involved in the illegal dispossession, the attempt of PW-4 to downplay the incident as a mere “quarrel” appears to be a self-serving narrative to shield the accused officers. His claim that the complainant’s house was a “rented house” and that the complainant simply “went away” upon seeing the police flies in the face of the overwhelming evidence of a violent eviction. Needless to say, the testimony of PW-4 (to the extent it conflicts with the direct evidence of PWs 1-3) cannot be accepted. The real facts have been brought forth by those who experienced them first-hand. No reliance can be placed on what is essentially a biased police account, especially when it is not supported by any independent or documentary proof. On the contrary, the official documentary evidence that does exist on the record supports the complainant: for example, the Mukhtiarkar of Matli (PW-5, Anwar Ali) submitted his spot inspection report (Ex.07/A & 07/B) soon after the incident, which was placed on the trial record. Although PW-5’s deposition was brief--he confirmed conducting the inspection on 17.04.2019 and submitting his report on 19.04.2019--its significance lies in the fact that the defence did not cross-examine PW-5 at all. The absence of any challenge to the Mukhtiarkar’s report suggests that it contained nothing that could help the defence; if anything, it likely noted that the complainant’s house was found in the appellants’ possession after the incident, thereby buttressing the allegation of dispossession. In sum, the appellants’ attempt to rely on selective portions of the evidence (the SHO’s hearsay narrative, or minor inconsistencies) is untenable in light of the totality of the evidence, which compellingly establishes their guilt.
20. Turning to the legal objections raised on behalf of the appellants, the Court finds them wholly devoid of merit. It was argued that this was essentially a civil/property dispute due to enmity, and thus a criminal conviction under the Illegal Dispossession Act was not warranted. This argument misapprehends both the facts and the law. Firstly, the existence of a prior dispute or enmity is a double-edged sword: while the defence portrays it as motive for a false case, it equally provides a motive for the appellants’ aggression (for instance, a protracted feud over the property could explain why the appellants resorted to self-help to settle scores). More importantly, even if there was a civil dispute pending or the appellants had some color of title, it is settled law that such circumstances do not grant any license to dispossess a person extra judicially. The Illegal Dispossession Act operates notwithstanding any civil litigation over the property. In Zahoor Ahmad v. The State (PLD 2007 Lah. 231) and Bashir Ahmad v. Addl. Sessions Judge (PLD 2010 SC 661), it had been held that proceedings under the Act would not be maintainable if civil suits were pending between the parties, but those findings have since been expressly overruled. The superior Courts now consistently hold that if an offence of illegal dispossession is committed, the perpetrator cannot evade accountability merely by pointing to a civil claim or rivalry. The present case starkly illustrates why: the law expects even a true owner to seek eviction through legal process (execution of a decree, etc.), rather than by brute force. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the age-old principle that “no one is allowed to take the law into his own hands”; even a landlord or owner must follow the due course of law to dispossess an occupier, and any forcible attempt to do so is illegal. In Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna (2001 SCMR 1700), the Supreme Court reiterated that a person in peaceful possession is protected by law and cannot be thrown out without a proper Court order -- if such such an act is done, the victim is entitled to restoration of possession and the wrongdoer is liable to punishment. Thus, the appellants grievance that the dispute was “of civil nature” is misplaced; their very conduct of taking the law into their own hands attracted the penal provisions of the Act. Secondly, it was contended (implicitly, by referring to the term “land grabbers”) that the legislature’s intent was to target organized qabza groups, not ordinary neighbors or individuals like the appellants. This contention is expressly negated by the language of Section 3 and by the case-law. The statute uses the words “no one” and “whoever” to describe the offender, indicating universality. As observed in Muhammad Akram u. Muhammad Yousaf (2009 SCMR 1066) and Mumtaz Hussain u. Dr. Nasir Khan (2010 SCMR 1254), the Illegal Dispossession Act provides efficacious relief to any lawful owner or occupier dispossessed by anyone without lawful authority, irrespective of the status or identity of the perpetrator. The attempt in some earlier judgments to limit the Act’s application only to cases involving notorious land mafias was deprecated by the Supreme Court, which declared such restrictions as not good law. In short, any person who commits the act described in Section 3(1)--as the appellants did here--is liable under the Act. There is no exemption for personal or inter-family squabbles. The present appellants, though perhaps not “professional land grabbers” in the conventional sense, have nonetheless perpetrated exactly the harm which the law seeks to redress: they violently and illegally dispossessed the lawful occupants of a house. Therefore, all the ingredients of the offence stood proved against them. The trial Court rightly convicted the appellants under Section 3(2) of the Act, and this Court, upon re-appraisal of the entire evidence and circumstances, finds no legal or factual infirmity in that conviction.
21. As a result of the foregoing discussion, the conviction of the appellants under Section 3(2) of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is upheld and their appeal to that extent is dismissed. Given the egregious facts of the case, the sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment awarded to each appellant cannot be termed harsh or excessive; it falls well within the punishment prescribed by law (which extends up to ten years) for such a grave offence. However, it was brought to the Court’s notice that the appellants have already undergone a substantial portion of the sentence. According to the jail custody certificates available on record, each appellant has served approximately 18 months of imprisonment, including remissions during this period. In aggregate, the time served in custody (including remissions earned) is roughly equivalent to the one and half years sentence awarded. In view of the fact that the appellants have effectively undergone the full length of the custodial sentence, the Court considers it unnecessary and unjust to require them to remain incarcerated any further on this account. Consequently, while maintaining the conviction and the sentences of fine and compensation, the appellants’ sentences of imprisonment are modified to the extent of being reduced to the period already undergone by them. The fine of Rs. 20,000/- each and compensation of Rs. 50,000/- each (payable to the complainant) as imposed by the trial Court shall remain intact; in case of non-payment, the default imprisonment (S.I. for six months) shall be enforced as per law. Except for the above modification, the impugned judgment of the trial Court is maintained
in entirety. The appellants are in custody; they are deemed to have served out their sentences for the purpose of imprisonment, and shall be released forthwith after payment of amount of fine and compensation as fixed by trial Court, if not required in any other case. Furthermore, the senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Badin is hereby directed under Section 8, Illegal Dispossession Act. 2005 to ensure that possession of the subject property is handed over to the complainant, namely Bhano, within a period of two (2) weeks from the date of this judgement. The appeal is dismissed with modification in sentence awarded by the trial Court.
22. Let the Copy of this Judgment be communicated to SSP Badin for strict compliance under the intimation of this Court through learned Additional Registrar of this Court.
(A.A.K.) Appeal dismissed
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