PLJ 2026 Cr.C. 377 (DB)
[Peshawar High Court, Peshawar]
Present: Sahibzada Asadullah and Kamran Hayat Mian Khel, JJ.
ARSHAD and another--Appellants
versus
ABDUL KHALID and another--Respondents
Crl. A. No. 532-P of 2025, decided on 10.2.2026.
Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860)--
دفعات 102 سے 100--دفاعِ ذات کا حق--قتلِ عمد--خطرہِ جان--طبی شواہد--پاکستان پینل کوڈ کی دفعات 102 اور 100 میں مدون دفاعِ نجی کا حق نہ تو محض آرائشی ہے اور نہ ہی نظریاتی؛ بلکہ یہ عقل، ضرورت اور بقا کی فطری جبلت پر مبنی ایک ٹھوس تحفظ ہے--مقننہ نے اچانک تشدد کی حقیقتوں سے مکمل آگاہی کے پیشِ نظر ان دفعات کو اس طرح مرتب کیا ہے کہ جان لیوا خطرے کی گھڑیوں میں قانون ٹھہر کر سوچ بچار اور جانچ پڑتال کا تقاضا نہ کرے--دفعہ 102 اپنے واضح الفاظ میں اس بات کا اعتراف کرتا ہے کہ دفاعِ نجی کا حق متحرک نوعیت کا حامل ہے، یہ خطرے کے معقول اندیشے کے پیدا ہوتے ہی وجود میں آ جاتا ہے اور جب تک یہ اندیشہ برقرار رہتا ہے، بلا تعطل قائم رہتا ہے--قانون اس بات کا تقاضا نہیں کرتا کہ خطرے میں گھرے شخص کو متبادل امکانات جانچنے کے لیے ٹھہرنا چاہیے، اور نہ ہی اسے پیچھے ہٹنے یا علیحدہ ہونے کا پابند بناتا ہے جہاں خطرہ بدستور قریب اور غالب ہو--پاکستان پینل کوڈ کی دفعہ 100 ایسے دفاع کی قانونی حدود متعین کر کے اس قانونی ڈھانچے کو تکمیل پہنچاتی ہے--جہاں حملہ جان یا شدید چوٹ لگنے کا معقول اندیشہ پیدا کرے، قانون اپنے جسمانی دفاع کے لیے جان لینے کا حق عطا کرتا ہے--یہ اختیار سہل پسندی سے نہیں دیا گیا؛ بلکہ یہ ضرورت، مناسبت اور خطرے کے تسلسل کی شرائط سے مشروط ہے--ان دونوں دفعات 102 اور 100 کو ملا کر پڑھنے سے ایک مربوط قانونی فریم ورک وجود میں آتا ہے جو انسانی زندگی کے تقدس اور غیر قانونی اور جان لیوا جارحیت کا سامنا کرنے پر اپنی جان بچانے کے اتنے ہی ناگزیر حق کے درمیان توازن قائم کرتا ہے--ان طے شدہ اصولوں کو پیشِ نظر رکھتے ہوئے جب موجودہ حقائق کا اطلاق کیا جائے تو جو صورتحال سامنے آتی ہے وہ یکساں اور مستقل ہے--مقتول حالات کا محض خاموش شکار نہیں تھا بلکہ وہی تشدد کا آغاز کرنے والا تھا--اسلحہ سے لیس ہو کر اس نے فائرنگ کی اور اپیل کنندہ کو زخمی کیا، جس سے فوری خطرے اور مسلسل دشمنی کی خصوصیات رکھنے والے واقعات کا ایک سلسلہ شروع ہو گیا--اس کے بعد جو کچھ ہوا وہ کوئی الگ تھلگ عمل نہیں تھا بلکہ ایک مسلسل جدوجہد تھی، ایک مہلک ہتھیار پر جسمانی کشمکش، جہاں زندگی اور موت کے درمیان فرق انتہائی نازک اور خطرناک حد تک کم تھا--طبی شواہد، جنہیں اکثر سب سے غیر جانبدار گواہ سمجھا جاتا ہے، اس حوالے سے بلیغ انداز میں گواہی دیتے ہیں--اسے دفعات 102 اور 100، پی پی سی کے تحفظ سے محروم رکھنا انتہائی خطرے کی گھڑیوں میں انسانی طرزِ عمل پر ایک مصنوعی اور غیر حقیقی معیار لاگو کرنا ہوگا، ایسا معیار جس کا تصور مقننہ نے نہیں کیا اور نہ ہی مستحکم قانونی اصولوں نے اس کی توثیق کی ہے--ٹرائل کورٹ مقدمے کے اس اہم پہلو کو پوری طرح سمجھنے میں ناکام رہا--جب معاملے پر درست طریقے سے غور کیا جائے تو اپیل کنندگان کی طرف سے اختیار کیا گیا دفاعِ نجی کا دعویٰ معقول اور جواز سے بھرپور ثابت ہوتا ہے--یہ ایک واضح مثال ہے جس میں پینل کوڈ کی دفعہ 100 کے تحت دفاعِ نجی کے حق کا فائدہ دیا جانا چاہیے--استغاثہ مجرمانہ نیت یا غیر قانونی زیادتی کو معقول شک سے بالاتر ثابت کرنے کا اپنا بوجھ اٹھانے میں ناکام رہا ہے--ٹرائل کورٹ خطرے کے تسلسل اور دفاعِ ذات کے زبردست شواہد کو نظر انداز کر کے حقائق اور قانون دونوں کی سنگین غلط فہمی کا شکار ہو گیا--اپیل منظور۔
----Ss. 102 to 100--Right of self-defence--Qatl-e-amd--Apprehension of death--Medical evidence--The right of private defence, codified in Sections 102 and 100 of Pakistan Penal Code, is neither ornamental nor theoretical; it is a substantive protection grounded in reason, necessity, and instinct of survival--The legislature, fully cognizant of realities of sudden violence, has framed these provisions to ensure that law does not demand measured deliberation in moments of mortal peril--Section 102, by its express language, recognizes that right of private defence is dynamic, it springs into existence when reasonable apprehension of danger arises and subsists uninterrupted so long as that apprehension endures--The law does not insist that threatened person must pause to weigh alternatives, nor does it require him to retreat or disengage where danger remains imminent and overpowering--Section 100, PPC completes this statutory scheme by defining lawful extent of such defence--Where assault reasonably occasions, an apprehension of death or grievous hurt, law confers right to cause death in defence of one’s person--This authority is not conferred lightly; it is conditioned upon necessity, proportionality, and continuity of threat--Read conjointly, Sections 102 and 100 form a coherent legal framework that balances sanctity of human life with equally compelling right to preserve one’s own life when confronted with unlawful and lethal aggression--Applying these settled principles to facts at hand, narrative that emerges is singular and consistent--The deceased was not a passive victim of circumstance; he was initiator of violence--Armed with a fire-arm, he discharged it and caused injury to appellant, thereby setting in motion a chain of events characterized by immediate danger and sustained hostility--What followed was not an isolated act but a continuous struggle, a physical contest over a deadly weapon, where margin between life and death was perilously thin--The medical evidence, often regarded as most impartial witness, speaks eloquently in this regard--To deny him protection of Sections 102 and 100, PPC would be to impose an artificial and unrealistic standard upon human conduct in moments of extreme peril, a standard neither contemplated by legislature nor endorsed by settled jurisprudence--Trial Court, failed to fully appreciate this crucial aspect of case--When matter is properly considered, plea of private defense asserted by appellants emerges as both reasonable and justified--This is a classical instance in which benefit of right of private defense under Section 100 of Penal Code must be extended--Prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving criminal intent or unlawful excess beyond reasonable doubt--Trial Court, in overlooking continuity of danger and compelling indicia of self-defence, fell into grave mis-appreciation of both fact and law--Appeal allowed. [Pp. 386 & 387] A, B & C
2012 SCMR 440.
Mr. Muhammad Saeed Khan, Advocate for Appellant.
Mr. Abdur Rauf Afridi, Addl. AG for State.
Respondent/Complainant in person.
Date of hearing: 10.2.2026.
Judgment
Sahibzada Asadullah, J.--Through this criminal appeal, appellants Arshad and Muhammad Tahir have questioned the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge-V/Judge Special Court, Mardan dated 10.05.2025 rendered in case FIR No. 01 dated 01.01.2019 under Section 302/34, PPC registered at Police Station Choora, District Mardan whereby, the appellants were convicted and sentenced as under:
“Under Section 302(b), PPC both accused to imprisonment for life as Tazir and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,00,000/-(rupees five lac) each to the legal heirs of the deceased within the meaning of Section 544-A, Cr.P.C. recoverable as arrears of land revenue and in default whereof, to further undergo simple imprisonment for six months each. Benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended in favour of the appellants.”
2. The background of the instant case is that on the application of the complainant under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. vide order dated 03.12.2018, the instant FIR No. 01 dated 01.01.2019 under Section 302, PPC was registered at Police Station Choora, District Mardan; that the application was filed in the backdrop of FIR No. 541 dated 22.09.2018 under Sections 324/427, PPC read with Section 15-AA, wherein SHO Muhammad Asif, upon receipt of information, proceeded to the house of accused Arshad at village Babini and found him along with co-accused Tahir present near the dead body of Muhammad Ishaq; that Arshid reported the matter to the effect that on the night of 22.09.2018 at about 1:30 a.m., he and other inmates were asleep, noise awakened him and he noticed the deceased armed with a pistol had trespassed into his house; that upon confrontation, the deceased attacked him and during the ensuing scuffle fired from his pistol, causing injuries to Arshad; that on hearing gunshot, co-accused Tahir awoke and, with Arshad, overpowered the deceased and snatched the pistol; that during the struggle, the deceased inflicted a bite injury on the ear of Tahir; that thereafter Arshid fired from the snatched pistol in exercise of the right of private defence, as a result whereof the deceased sustained injuries and died at the spot; that the occurrence was stated to have been witnessed by Tahir, while ignorance regarding motive was expressed; that the accused were charged for the commission of offence.
3. After necessary investigation, complete challan was submitted before the Court. Provisions of Section 265-C, Cr.P.C. were complied with and the appellants were charge sheeted, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution produced and examined as many as 13 witnesses. After closure of prosecution evidence, statements of the appellants were recorded under Section 342, Cr.P.C., wherein they posed innocence, however, neither they wished to be examined on Oath as required under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C., nor wanted to produce evidence in defence. The learned trial Court, after full-fledged trial convicted and sentenced the appellants vide the impugned judgment hence, the instant appeal.
4. Arguments heard and record scanned through with valuable assistance of the learned counsel.
5. The present case stands apart for its unusual and somewhat paradoxical factual complexion. The occurrence admittedly took place within the precincts of the house of the appellants, where the deceased Muhammad Ishaq, met an untimely death. However, the same occurrence also resulted in serious injuries to the appellants themselves: appellant Arshid sustained a fire-arm injury, while appellant Tahir received lacerated wounds in the course of physical scuffle with the deceased. Thus, the episode presents a singular situation where death and injuries were suffered on both sides, and that too at the dwelling of the accused. Upon receipt of information, the police promptly reached the spot, where the complainant reported the incident, narrating the circumstances in which injuries were caused to him and to his brother. In consequence thereof, the requisite legal formalities were undertaken at the spot: injury sheets of the injured appellants were prepared, and the inquest report of the deceased was prepared. The injured were immediately shifted to the hospital for medico-legal examination, whereas the dead body of the deceased was sent for post-mortem examination. The medical officer examined the injured appellants and issued their respective medico-legal certificates. Likewise, the post-mortem examination of the deceased was duly conducted, whereafter the dead body, along with the post-mortem report, was handed over to the escorting police constable. The Investigating Officer thereafter, visited the place of occurrence and, at the instance of the eye-witnesses/appellants, prepared the site plan so as to reflect the physical features of the scene. During spot inspection, 06 empties of 9 MM and one spent bullet were recovered from the place of occurrence. The pistol allegedly used during the incident was also taken into possession and handed over to the investigating officer, whereupon the relevant provisions of law were applied. The recovered empties, along with the pistol, were sent to the forensic expert for examination. The report subsequently received confirmed that the empties had been fired from the said weapon. What is of critical significance is that, notwithstanding the death of Muhammad Ishaq at the spot, no person was initially nominated as an accused in respect of his murder, rather the deceased himself stood as the sole accused in the case registered at the instance of the appellants concerning the fire-arm injury and other wounds sustained by them. It was only after the passage of a considerable period that the course of investigation took a decisive turn. Thereafter, the father of the deceased recorded his statement before the Investigating Officer and thereafter approached the Court of competent jurisdiction. On the basis of an application moved under Section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, through the intervention of an Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace, FIR No. 01 dated 01.01.2019 was registered, wherein the present appellants were nominated and charged for the murder of the deceased. Meanwhile, owing to the death of the sole accused in the earlier case, the deceased Muhammad Ishaq, challan was submitted before the competent Court, rendering those proceedings incapable of further continuation. Consequently, the appellants were put to trial in the instant case. Upon conclusion of the proceedings, they were convicted and sentenced through the impugned judgment, which now forms the subject-matter of the present appeal.
6. The learned trial Court, after a careful and traditional application of its judicial mind to the evidence on record, arrived at the conclusion that the appellants were responsible for the commission of the offence and, accordingly, convicted and sentenced them vide the impugned judgment. This Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, is now called upon to examine whether the learned trial Court was justified in reaching such a conclusion, whether the evidence on file was properly appreciated, and whether the responsibility of the appellants was assessed in light of the unique circumstances of the case. The matter demands scrutiny of how the incident occurred and who, in fact, bore responsibility for the tragic sequence of events, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased, without justification or plausible cause, entered the house of the appellants during the odd hours of the night. It is incumbent upon this Court to determine whether the incident unfolded in the manner and at the stated time, and whether the trial Court sufficiently appreciated the distinct circumstances surrounding the pela of the appellants of self-defence.
7. It is pertinent to mention that following the incident, the appellants themselves lodged a case against the deceased for the injuries inflicted upon them. The Investigating Officer, during the course of inquiry, concluded regarding the innocence of the appellants, resulting in their names being placed in column 2 of the challan. The opinion of the investigating officer is not binding upon the Court, it nonetheless constitutes a material circumstance which, in cases of this unique character, warrants careful consideration. Given that the incident occurred within the house of the appellants and during the late hours, when the intruder i.e. the deceased Muhammad Ishaq, entered without lawful justification, it was imperative for the trial Court to weigh both narratives with impartiality. The Court ought to have considered whether, under the attending circumstances, the appellants could be held responsible, or whether they were entitled to the protections afforded by the plea of self-defence. The singular nature of this case, in terms of its factual back ground and legal complexity, necessitates the application of extra caution. This Court must meticulously examine both the legal and factual aspects to determine who was responsible, who was at fault, and whether the intrusion of the deceased into the house of the appellants at the stated time could, in any manner, be deemed justified. It is clear from the record that the unfortunate incident occurred during the late hours of the night. Almost immediately, the local police reached the house of the appellants, acting upon information provided by appellant Arshid. The matter was first recorded in the form of a murasila, noting that the deceased had discharged a fire-arm and caused injuries to the co-accused. Injury reports for the appellants and the inquest report of the deceased were duly prepared. The pistol, handed over by appellant Arshid, was taken into possession, and a recovery memo. was prepared by the scribe, who was examined as PW-8, who deposed that upon reaching the house, he observed the scene as it existed. Both appellants were injured, while the deceased lay lifeless on the ground. The injured were shifted to the hospital for medical examination, and the deceased was sent for post-mortem. His testimony, when tested in cross-examination, remained clear, consistent, and credible. The investigating officer, PW-12, stated that upon receiving a copy of the FIR, he visited the scene and, on the pointation of eye-witnesses/ appellants, prepared the site plan. During his inspection, blood through cotton were collected, and 06 empties of 9 MM, along with the pistol, were taken into possession. Statements of other witnesses, including Mst. Saira wife of appellant Arshid (PW-9), and Mst. Sadia, niece of the appellants (PW-10), were also recorded. Both witnesses provided a clear and consistent account of the events. Mst Saira testified that she was asleep with her husband when footsteps were heard in the Courtyard. The deceased entered the house, prompting appellant Arshid to wake and engage in a struggle. Appellant Tahir joined the confrontation. During this altercation, the deceased, armed with a pistol, fired at Arshid, wounding him, while Tahir sustained bruises. PW-9 further explained that appellant Arshid managed to snatch the weapon from the deceased, yet the latter tried to regain control. In the course of this struggle, appellant Arshid fired at the deceased, causing his death. The witnesses remained consistent under cross-examination, confirming that the confrontation occurred entirely within the house and was initiated by the unlawful entry and aggression of the deceased. The deceased was shifted to the hospital, where the father of the deceased, Abdul Khaliq, and his brother-in-law, Muhammad Riaz, stood as identifiers to the body. Yet, it is pertinent to mention that Abdul Khaliq did not, at that juncture, charged the appellants of committing the offence or of murdering his son. Rather, it was only at a considerably belated stage that he recorded statement charging the appellants with the death of the deceased. He explained that, on the night of the occurrence, the appellant Arshid had visited his residence and requested the deceased to accompany him to his house for some personal matter. When the deceased did not return, Abdul Khaliq heard the sound of gunfire, rushed to the street, encountered the assembled crowd, and was informed that his son had been killed and that his lifeless body lay inside the house of the appellant. It is true that, in this regard, an application was submitted under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C., following which the present case was registered. Yet, this Court must consider why, when the complainant was aware that his son had accompanied the appellants and when the dead body of the deceased was subsequently identified at the hospital, he did not immediately charge the accused with the murder. Why did he await many days before lodging the allegation? Such delay inevitably casts a shadow upon the veracity of the narrative, raising the question whether the deceased had indeed been taken by the appellants with the deliberate intention to kill, or whether events unfolded in a manner different from that suggested by the complainant therefore, this Court is constrained to observe that mere account of the complainant, particularly when tendered belatedly and without contemporaneous reporting, cannot by itself suffice to hold the accused guilty of the murder, or to establish with certainty that the appellants had harboured a premeditated design to take the life of the deceased. Significantly, the report filed by the appellants under FIR No. 541, coupled with the statements of eye-witnesses residing in the house, most notably Mst. Saira and the niece of the appellant, Mst. Sadia offers a contrasting and compelling account. These witnesses, having recorded their statements before the Investigating Officer and later before the learned trial Court, confirmed that the deceased met his death at the hands of the appellant Arshid. Yet, they elaborated upon the circumstances: how the deceased entered the house, how a struggle ensued, how the deceased fired at the appellant, how the pistol was snatched, and how, in the ensuing grapple, the fatal shots were discharged. When these two narratives are placed in juxtaposition, no ambiguity remains. This Court is inclined to accept the version advanced by the appellants, as corroborated by the eye-witnesses, and cannot lend credence to the story narrated by Abdul Khaliq. It is, therefore, held that the incident did not occur in the manner suggested by the complainant, but rather transpired in accordance with the sequence of events set forth by the appellants and confirmed by those present at the scene.
8. The Investigating Officer, examined as PW-12, elaborated upon the course of the investigation with detail. He explained how the incident was initially reported, how he visited the scene, collected blood-stained earth and empties, and ultimately succeeded in recovering the weapon, which had already been discovered by an earlier crime team prior to his arrival. The officer further stated that during the course of the investigation, the opinion of the District Public Prosecutor was sought. On the basis of this opinion, coupled with inquiries conducted in the locality regarding the alleged character of the deceased, the circumstances of his entry into the house of the appellant, and the purported innocence of the accused, the names of the appellants were initially recorded in column II of the challan. It was after six years later, when the proceedings had advanced, that the learned trial Court directed their appearance and committed them to trial. In cross-examination, PW-12 was questioned regarding the essential aspects of the case. He confirmed that he had visited the area, recorded statements from numerous persons concerning the character of the deceased, the circumstances of the occurrence, and the alleged innocence of the appellants. He clarified that nowhere in the statements was it directly asserted that the appellants did not cause the death of the deceased, rather the opinion of the innocence of the appellants stemmed from the finding that the deceased had entered the house armed and with hostile intent, seeking to inflict harm upon the appellants. It was during the ensuing struggle that the appellant, in a bid to defend himself, caused the death of the deceased. When these circumstances are considered alongside the opinion rendered by the Investigating Officer, no ambiguity remains regarding the character, actions, or background of the deceased. These factors are, therefore, of fundamental importance to the just determination of the case. At the same time, this Court cannot overlook the presence of eye-witnesses at the scene at the relevant time. Their statements are of undoubted evidentiary value and cannot be disregarded. Equally, the stance of the appellants, as reported initially and consistently maintained throughout the proceedings, merits careful consideration. When the statements of the appellants were recorded under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, they provided lucid and consistent account: how the deceased entered the house, how the struggle ensued, how shots were fired striking the arm of one of the appellant, and how, in the course of attempting to regain control of the weapon, the firing of the appellant resulted in the death of the deceased. Once the appellants remained steadfast in their plea and do not repudiate it upon being questioned under Section 342, Cr.P.C., the clarity and consistency of their accounts leave no room for doubt. It is the preponderance of evidence, the totality of statements, medical evidence, eye-witness accounts, and the sequence of events as narrated that must guide the Court. In contrast, the statement of the complainant cannot inspire confidence, particularly given his failure to name the accused or seek registration of the case on the very day of the occurrence. In light of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to place due reliance upon the investigative report, the testimony of the witnesses, the medical evidence, and the participation of the parties in the unfortunate occurrence, all of which collectively illuminate the truth of the matter and guide the just determination of the case.
9. The moot question for determination before this Court is whether the appellants are entitled to the benefits conferred under Section 100 of the Pakistan Penal Code. In essence, the Court is tasked with assessing whether the deceased was killed while the appellants were exercising their right of private defense, and whether there existed such imminent danger to their lives that they were left with no alternative but to use force, resulting in the death of the deceased. To appreciate this aspect of the case, it is essential to recapitulate the circumstances, as revealed in the initial report and corroborated by the statements of eye-witnesses, particularly Mst. Saira wife of the appellant, and Mst. Sadia, niece of the appellants. These accounts enable the Court to gauge the degree of responsibility borne by the appellants, and to determine whether the benefit of Section 100 is justly extendable to them. Certain facts are undisputed. It is admitted that the unfortunate incident occurred within the house of the appellants. It is equally admitted that the deceased, acting as an intruder, entered the house during the dark hours of the night, armed with a pistol, and approached the room of the appellant. Upon discovering a stranger in his house, the appellant naturally defended himself, and a struggle ensued. The appellant initially received injuries, followed by injuries sustained by the deceased. The crucial question is whether the appellants could have extricated themselves from the peril without resorting to lethal force, or whether the circumstances were such that no other course of action was available. The complainant and the witnesses acknowledged that the appellant succeeded in snatching the pistol from the deceased. On a superficial appreciation, one might contend that once possession of the weapon was secured, there was no need for further violence, and any resulting death might be construed as exceeding the permissible limits of private defense. However, mere reductionist view of the incident would fail to capture the true dynamics of the encounter.
10. The right of private defence, codified in Sections 102 and 100 of the Pakistan Penal Code, is neither ornamental nor theoretical; it is a substantive protection grounded in reason, necessity, and the instinct of survival. The legislature, fully cognizant of the realities of sudden violence, has framed these provisions to ensure that the law does not demand measured deliberation in moments of mortal peril. Section 102, by its express language, recognizes that the right of private defence is dynamic, it springs into existence when reasonable apprehension of danger arises and subsists uninterrupted so long as that apprehension endures. The law does not insist that the threatened person must pause to weigh alternatives, nor does it require him to retreat or disengage where the danger remains imminent and overpowering. Section 100, PPC completes this statutory scheme by defining the lawful extent of such defence. Where the assault reasonably occasions, an apprehension of death or grievous hurt, the law confers the right to cause death in defence of one’s person. This authority is not conferred lightly; it is conditioned upon necessity, proportionality, and the continuity of threat. Read conjointly, Sections 102 and 100 form a coherent legal framework that balances the sanctity of human life with the equally compelling right to preserve one’s own life when confronted with unlawful and lethal aggression. Applying these settled principles to the facts at hand, the narrative that emerges is singular and consistent. The deceased was not a passive victim of circumstance; he was the initiator of violence. Armed with a fire-arm, he discharged it and caused injury to the appellant, thereby setting in motion a chain of events characterized by immediate danger and sustained hostility. What followed was not an isolated act but a continuous struggle, a physical contest over a deadly weapon, where the margin between life and death was perilously thin. The medical evidence, often regarded as the most impartial witness, speaks eloquently in this regard. The fire-arm injuries sustained by the deceased on right side of Nasal Bridge and right eye, anteriorly on neck below from Adam’s Apple and right side of Mandibular are not random or coincidental; they are spatially and anatomically consistent with a close-quarter struggle in which the deceased was grappling with the appellant in an attempt to overpower him and reclaim the weapon. The placement of these injuries is of decisive legal significance. It affirms that at the crucial moment, the appellant was not in a position of dominance or safety; he was on the ground, under physical restraint, and confronting an assailant determined to regain lethal control. This factual matrix decisively negates any suggestion of deliberation, retaliation, or excess. The appellant did not pursue the deceased; he resisted him. He did not act after the danger had passed; he acted while the danger was unfolding. His response was not the product of vengeance, but the consequence of necessity, a necessity born of an immediate, continuous, and life-threatening assault. It must be underscored that the law of private defence does not require the accused to suffer injury or death before acting; it requires only a reasonable apprehension thereof. Nor does it require mathematical precision in the response, for the law recognizes that in moments of violent confrontation, exact calibration of force is neither humanly possible nor legally expected. The test is not whether a lesser force might hypothetically have sufficed, but whether, in the circumstances as they existed, the accused acted as a reasonable person would when confronted with imminent mortal danger. Judged by this standard, the appellant’s conduct cannot be faulted. Viewed cumulatively, the evidence unmistakably establishes that the right of private defence had arisen, that it continued unabated, and that it lawfully extended to the causing of death. The act of the appellant was inseparably linked to the struggle that precipitated it, proportionate to the threat confronted, and justified by the necessity to preserve life. To deny him the protection of Sections 102 and 100, PPC would be to impose an artificial and unrealistic standard upon human conduct in moments of extreme peril, a standard neither contemplated by the legislature nor endorsed by settled jurisprudence. The learned trial Court, in our respectful view, failed to fully appreciate this crucial aspect of the case. When the matter is properly considered, the plea of private defense asserted by the appellants emerges as both reasonable and justified. This, in our understanding, is a classical instance in which the benefit of the right of private defense under Section 100 of the Penal Code must be extended. Consequently, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving criminal intent or unlawful excess beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial Court, in overlooking the continuity of danger and the compelling indicia of self-defence, fell into grave mis-appreciation of both fact and law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the apex Court titled “Muhammad Akram vs. The State” (2012 SCMR 440), wherein, it has been held as under:
“In view of the law referred above, it is crystal clear that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the appellant has not at all exceeded his right of self-defence rather he rightly acted in his self-defence, as such, we believe the version of the appellant put forward by him in his statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C. in toto and disbelieve the prosecution evidence.”
11. The attending circumstances of this case inexorably lead to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial Court, in
delivering the impugned judgment, failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record and fell into error both on facts and law. In these circumstances, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and warrants interference by this Court. Accordingly, the instant criminal appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is hereby set aside, and the appellants are acquitted of the charge levelled against them. They shall be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in connection with any other matter.
(A.A.K.) Appeal allowed
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