PLD 2024 SC 810
The right of appeal is a creation of a statute, and no such right can be implied. We now proceed to consider the language of section 43 of the Act. This section enacts that “any person aggrieved by an order of the Special Judge passed under section 31, section 32 or section 34 may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal before the Special Appellate Court whose decision thereon shall be final.” The words “person aggrieved” seems to be the governing words, and show that the object of the legislature is to give an appeal where the legal right of the person is infringed and he has suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by order of the Special Judge passed under section 31, 32 or 34 of the Act. To perfect the understanding of this point, we deem it appropirate to quote here the remarks made by James L. J. in Re Sidebotham. He said, ‘the words “person aggrieved” do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A “person aggrieved” must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.’ However, in the present case, it is said that the Anti Narcotic Force, being the complainant, was “aggrieved” as it had informed the Special Judge that the properties were acquired by smuggling, which was erroneously found not true by the Special Judge. We are not disposed to accept that. A plain reading of the Act’s scheme, particularly section 31, clarifies that the Special Judge may receive information (complaint) from ‘any person’. In this case, as discussed above, the informer was the Anti-Narcotic Force. After the information was conveyed to the Special Judge, the informer had no further role, as there was no statutory duty for the informer to appear before the Special Judge nor to produce evidence supporting the information. The informer was also not required to file a written statement in response to the accused’s position, and the Special Judge was not required to adjudicate between the accused and the informer. Quite the contrary, after receiving the information, the matter entirely had become one between the Special Judge and the accused. This is so because, under Section 33 of the Act, the accused bears the burden of proving that any property specified in a notice under Section 31 is not acquired through smuggling. It appears that it was for this reason the Anti-Narcotic Force, apart from the information presented to the Special Judge, did not adduce any oral or documentary evidence. At that, its no legal right was infringed, and it had suffered no legal wrong or injury. In the circumstances, the Anti-Narcotic Force, which could not succeed in getting a forfeiture order against all the properties of the accused, could be said, to be annoyed by the findings of the Special Judge. It could also feel that what was considered a breach of law was wrongly held to be not a breach of law by the Special Judge. Despite all this, the Anti Narcotic Force could not be described as a person aggrieved rather as a person annoyed at best, and so, was not entitled to prefer an appeal against the Special Judge’s order under section 43 of the Act. As a result, its appeal was rightly held to be not maintainable.
Civil Appeal No.277 of 2014
The State through A.N.F., Rawalpindi Versus Obaid Khan
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