PLJ 2026 Cr.C. 410 (DB)
[Lahore High Court, Lahore]
Present: Farooq Haider and Ali Zia Bajwa, JJ.
KHALID MEHMOOD--Appellant
versus
STATE, etc.--Respondents
Crl. A. No. 18965 of 2026, decided on 31.3.2026.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
مقدمے کے کسی بھی مرحلے پر ملزم کو بری کرنے کا مجسٹریٹ کا اختیار-- یہ بات بالکل قابل فہم ہے کہ قانون ساز ادارے نے اپنی دانائی میں دفعہ 249-اے ۔ ضابطہ فوجداری کے تحت مجسٹریٹ کو یہ اختیار دیا کہ وہ مقدمے کے کسی بھی مرحلے پر ملزم کو بری کر دے اگر الزام بے بنیاد ہو یا سزا کا کوئی امکان نہ ہو، اس کی وجہ یہ ہے کہ مجسٹریٹ کی عدالت میں قابل سماعت جرائم کی سزائیں، عدالت سیشن میں قابل سماعت جرائم کے لیے مقرر کردہ سزاؤں کے مقابلے میں کم ہوتی ہیں، لہذا، اگر مجسٹریٹ اس نتیجے پر پہنچتا ہے کہ ریکارڈ پر موجود مواد/شہادت کی بنیاد پر الزام بے بنیاد ہے، تو وہ ملزم کو دفعہ 249-اے ۔ ضابطہ فوجداری کے تحت بری کر سکتا ہے اور مزید برآں، اگر اسے یہ معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ ایسا مواد ریکارڈ پر آ گیا ہے کہ اب ملزم کے کسی بھی جرم میں مجرم ٹھہرنے کا کوئی امکان نہیں ہے، تو وہ ملزم کو دفعہ 249-اے ۔ ضابطہ فوجداری کے تحت بری بھی کر سکتا ہے، جبکہ چونکہ عدالت سیشن میں قابل سماعت جرائم سنگین نوعیت کے ہوتے ہیں جن میں بھاری سزائیں شامل ہوتی ہیں، اس لیے الزام کے بے بنیاد ہونے کی بنیاد پر ملزم کی بریت دفعہ 265-K ضابطہ فوجداری میں فراہم نہیں کی گئی ہے اور استغاثہ کو مقدمہ ثابت کرنے کے لیے شہادتیں پیش کرنے کا مکمل اور بھرپور موقع فراہم کیا جانا ہے، اور اس حوالے سے، دفعہ 265-ایف ۔ ضابطہ فوجداری کی ذیلی شق 2 کا بھی حوالہ دیا جا سکتا ہے، جس کے مطابق، عدالت پبلک پراسیکیوٹر یا، جیسا کہ صورت حال تقاضا کرے، فریادی سے مقدمے کے حقائق سے واقف ہونے اور استغاثہ کے لیے شہادت دینے کے قابل کسی بھی شخص کے نام معلوم کرے گی، اور ایسے اشخاص کو عدالت میں شہادت دینے کے لیے طلب کرے گی؛ فوری حوالے کے لیے، دفعہ 265-ایف ۔ ضابطہ فوجداری کی ذیلی شق 2۔
----Ss. 249-A, 265-K & 265-F--Power of Magistrate to acquit accused at any stage of case--It is quite understandable that legislature in its wisdom gave power under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. to Magistrate to acquit accused at any stage of case if charge is groundless or there is no probability of conviction for reason that punishments for offences triable by Court of Magistrates are lesser as compared to punishments provided for offences triable by Court of Sessions, therefore, if Magistrate comes to conclusion that on basis of material/evidence available on record, charge is groundless, he can acquit accused under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. and furthermore, if he finds that such material has come on record that now there is no probability of accused being convicted of any offence, he can also acquit accused under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. whereas since offences triable by Court of Sessions are of heinous/ serious nature entailing heavy punishments, therefore, acquittal of accused on basis of charge is groundless is not provided in Section 265-K ….. Cr.P.C. and prosecution is to be afforded full and complete opportunity to produce evidence for proving case and in this regard, Subsection 2 of Section 265-F Cr.P.C. can also be safely referred, according to which, Court shall ascertain from Public Prosecutor or, as case may be from complainant, names of any persons likely to be acquainted with facts of case and to be able to give evidence for prosecution, and shall summon such persons to give evidence before it; for ready reference, Subsection 2 of Section 265-F Cr.P.C. [P. 419] A
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
ملزم کو سزا-- تاہم، اگر عدالت یہ پائے کہ کسی بھی جرم میں ملزم کی سزا کا کوئی امکان نہیں ہے، تو صرف اسی صورت میں مقدمے کے کسی بھی مرحلے پر اسے دفعہ 265-کے ضابطہ فوجداری کے تحت بری کیا جا سکتا ہے، یعنی اگر ایسی نوعیت کا مواد یا شہادت ریکارڈ پر آ چکا ہو کہ کسی بھی نوعیت یا قسم کی مزید کوئی شہادت ملزم کی سزا کا موجب نہیں بن سکتی، تو اسے دفعہ 265-کے ضابطہ فوجداری کے تحت بری کیا جا سکتا ہے۔
----S. 265-K--Conviction of accused-- However, if Court finds that there is no probability of conviction of accused of any offence only then, he can be acquitted at any stage of case under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. i.e. if evidence/material of such nature has come on record that further evidence of any nature/kind whatsoever cannot result into conviction of accused, then he can be acquitted under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. [P. 420] B
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
دفعات 265-کے اور 249-اے:
ملزم کی بریت، اطلاق، اور اختیارات۔ ملزم کو بری کیا جا سکتا ہے اور اسی طرح، اگر ریکارڈ پر ایسا کوئی مواد یا شہادت آ جاتا ہے جس کی وجہ سے سزا دینا ناممکن ہو جائے، تب بھی ملزم کو دفعہ 249-A ضابطہ فوجداری کے تحت بری کیا جا سکتا ہے۔ جبکہ دفعہ 265-ک ضابطہ فوجداری کے تحت، عدالت سیشن کیس کے کسی بھی مرحلے پر ملزم کو بری کر سکتی ہے اگر ایسا مواد یا شہادت ریکارڈ پر آ جائے جو سزا کو ناممکن بنا دے اور مزید کوئی شہادت نتیجے کو تبدیل نہ کر سکے۔ ملزم/اپیل کنندہ کے کسی بھی جرم میں سزا پانے کا کوئی امکان نہیں ہے، لہذا، ایسے حالات میں دفعہ 265-ک ضابطہ فوجداری کے تحت اختیار استعمال کرنے اور مقدمہ استغاثہ کو اس کی ابتدائی حالت یعنی ابتدائی مرحلے پر ہی ختم کرنے کی کوئی گنجائش نہیں ہے۔ مزید برآں، یہ وضاحت کی جاتی ہے کہ دفعہ 265-ک ضابطہ فوجداری کے تحت اختیار کے استعمال کے لیے، نہ صرف دستیاب مواد یا شہادت ہی متعلقہ ہے بلکہ وہ مواد یا شہادت بھی جسے پیش کیا جا سکتا ہے اور اگر پیش کی جائے تو ملزم کو کسی بھی جرم کا مجرم ٹھہرایا جا سکتا ہے، اسے بھی مدنظر رکھنا ضروری ہے۔
----Ss. 265-K & 249-A--Acquittal of accused--Application--Power of--Accused can be acquitted and similarly, such sort of material/evidence if comes on record, which has made conviction impossible, even then accused can be acquitted under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. whereas under Section 265-K Cr.P.C., accused can be acquitted at any stage of case by Court of Sessions if such sort of material/evidence comes on record, which makes conviction impossible and any further evidence cannot change result--There is no probability of conviction of accused/ appellant of any offence, therefore, in such circumstances, there is no occasion for exercising power under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. and throttling case of prosecution at its infancy i.e. initial stage--Furthermore, it is clarified that for invoking power under Section 265-K Cr.P.C., material/evidence available is not only relevant but material/evidence, which can be produced, and if produced, can cause conviction of accused of any offence, is also to be considered.
[P. 420] C & D
Malik Zia Shafiq, Advocate for Appellant.
Mr. Haroon Rasheed, Deputy Prosecutor General for State (on Court’s call).
Date of hearing: 31.3.2026.
Order
Through instant criminal appeal filed under Section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, Khalid Mehmood (appellant/ accused in case arising out of F.I.R. No. 28/2024 dated 23.05.2024 registered under Sections 9(1) 2(d), 14 and 15 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 at Police Station ANF, District: Faisalabad) has challenged the vires of order dated 26.01.2026 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Faisalabad/trial Court, whereby application under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. filed by him for his acquittal, has been dismissed; relevant portion of the impugned order is hereby reproduced as under:
“3. Perusal of record reveals that after hearing the arguments at length reached to the conclusion that now PSFA forensic laboratory is an authentic laboratory of the Asia. Complete detailed report of PFSA was received and available on record. As per record petitioner/ Khalid Mehmood was caught red-handed by the police. He along with his co-accused got recovered 50 nylon sacks of poppy straw, on weighing, each of the aforesaid sacks came to 48 kilograms, making total of 2400 kilograms of poppy straw which is heavy quantity of narcotics material, detail of which has been mentioned in recovery memo. which is on the file. Accused has been charge-sheeted and case is fixed for evidence. Such type of accused are social enemy who transporting such type of narcotics and material and provide the same to young generation for destroying their lives and future, therefore, Such types of people are not entitled to any kind of leniency. The accused was charge-sheeted on 23.09.2024. Now case was fixed for summoning of prosecution witnesses through non-bailable warrant of arrest through SHO concerned. SHO is directed to appoint any responsible person to procure the attendance of witnesses. At this stage, this petition is premature as after recording of evidence of the prosecution and hearing arguments of both side, the case will be decided on merits. Hence, this petition under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. is dismissed. This application be attached with the main case file.”
2. Brief however necessary facts for decision of instant appeal are that as per case of prosecution, poppy straw weighing 2400-kilograms was recovered from present appellant and his co-accused who were transporting the same, report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. was submitted in the Court, copies under Section 265-C Cr.P.C. were delivered to the accused persons including present appellant and charge was framed against them on 23.09.2024; copy of the charge sheet is available at Pages Nos. 10-11 of instant appeal and the same is hereby scanned below for ready reference:


Present appellant and his co-accused namely Sajjad Saheb denied the charge and claimed trial, examination-in-chief of Muhammad Bilal, H.C/Moharrir was recorded as PW-1 on 26.02.2025 however cross-examination over him was reserved on behalf of the accused persons; application under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. was filed by present appellant, which was dismissed vide aforementioned order dated 26.01.2026 passed by the trial Court and the same has been impugned herein through instant appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that impugned order is against the law and facts of the case therefore same is liable to be set aside.
On Court’s query, he submits that though report of Punjab Forensic Science Agency in this case has been received yet same has still not been exhibited in the case.
4. Learned Deputy Prosecutor General has supported the impugned order.
5. Arguments heard and record appended with the appeal perused.
6. It has been noticed that as per case of prosecution, poppy straw weighing 2400-kilograms was recovered from present appellant and his co-accused. Poppy Straw has been defined under Section 2 (w) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and for ready reference, same is hereby reproduced as under:
“Section 2(W)
“poppy straw” means all the parts, except the seeds, of the opium poppy after mowing;”
(emphasis added)
Perusal of aforementioned definition clearly reveals that “poppy straw” means all the parts, except the seeds, of the opium after mowing. It (poppy straw) is a narcotic drug as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act (ibid), which is hereby reproduced below for ready reference:
“Section 2 (s)
““narcotic drug” means coca leaf, cannabis, heroin, opium, poppy straw and all manufactured drugs;”
(emphasis added)
Furthermore, it has been categorically mentioned in Section 6 of the Act (ibid) that no one shall produce, manufacture, extract, prepare, possess, offer for sale, sell, purchase, distribute, deliver, transport, dispatch, any narcotic drug, psychotropic substance or controlled substance; for ready reference, Section 6 of the Act (ibid) is hereby reproduced as under:
“6. Prohibition of possession of narcotic drugs etc.--No one shall produce, manufacture, extract, prepare, possess, offer for sale, sell, purchase, distribute, deliver on any terms whatsoever, transport, dispatch, any narcotic drug, psychotropic substance or controlled substance, except for medical, scientific or industrial purposes in the manner and subject to such conditions as may be specified by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force.”
(emphasis added)
Similarly, import of narcotic drug into Pakistan, export from Pakistan, transport within Pakistan or transship of any narcotic drug, psychotropic substance or controlled substance has been prohibited under Section 7 of the Act (ibid), which is hereby reproduced below for ready reference:
“7. Prohibition of import or export of narcotic drugs, etc.--
(1) No one shall--
(a) import into Pakistan;
(b) export from Pakistan;
(c) transport within Pakistan; or
(d) tranship
any narcotic drug, psychotropic substance or controlled substance, save in accordance with rules made under sub-section (2) and in accordance with the conditions of any licence, permit or authorization for that purpose which may be required to be obtained under those rules.
(emphasis added)
(2) The Federal Government may make rules permitting and regulating the import into and export from Pakistan, transport within Pakistan and transhipment of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances or controlled substances, and such rules may prescribe the ports or places at which any kind of narcotic drug, psychotropic substance or controlled substance may be imported, exported, transported within Pakistan or transhipped, the form and conditions of license, permit or authorities by which such licences, permits or authorization may be granted, the fees that may be charged therefor, any other matter required to have effective control of the Federal Government over such import, export, transportation and transhipment.”
Likewise, trafficking in or financing the trafficking of narcotic drugs etc. has also been prohibited under Section 8 of the Act (ibid), which is also hereby reproduced as under:
“8. Prohibition on trafficking or financing the trafficking of narcotic drugs etc.–No one shall–(a) organize, manage, traffic in, or finance the import, transport, manufacturing or trafficking of, narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances or controlled substances; or
(b) use violence or arms for committing or attempt to commit an offence punishable under this Act.”
(emphasis added)
Contravention of Sections 6, 7 and 8 (mentioned above) has been made punishable under Section 9 of the Act (ibid) and punishment to the extent of “Post (پوست)” or “Poppy Straw” has been mentioned in Section 9(1) 2(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Act (ibid) which are scanned below for ready reference:
“9. Punishment for contravention of Sections 6, 7 and 8.-(1) Whoever contravenes the provisions of Sections 6, 7 and 8 regarding narcotic drugs shall be punished with punishment as given in column (3) of the TABLE below with regard to offence committed as mentioned in column (2) thereof, namely:
2. | Post or poppy straw | (a) Up to 999 grams. | imprisonment which may extend to four years but shall not be less than eight months along with fine which may be up to twenty thousand rupees. |
(b) 1000 grams to 9999 grams. | imprisonment which may extend to eight years but shall not be less than four years along with fine which may be up to two hundred thousand rupees but shall not be less than twenty thousand rupees. | ||
(c) 10000 grams to 14999 grams. | imprisonment which may extend to fourteen years but shall not be less than eight years along with fine which may be up to three hundred thousand rupees but not less than two hundred thousand rupees. | ||
(d) 15000 grams or more. | imprisonment which may extend to life imprisonment but shall not be less than fourteen years along-with fine which shall not be less than three hundred thousand rupees. |
Allegation against appellant and his co-accused is that Poppy Straw weighing 2400-kilograms was recovered from them who were transporting the same, therefore, charge has been rightly framed against them and for proving the same, prosecution has legal right to produce the evidence, and Muhammad Bilal HC/ Moharrar has been produced as PW-1 whose examination in chief has been recorded and cross-examination over him has been reserved on behalf of the accused persons.
It is relevant to mention here that cases which are to be tried by the Magistrate under Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (hereinafter to be referred as “Code”), Magistrate has the power to acquit the accused at any stage of the case under Section 249-A of the Code (ibid) if after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, he considers that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence; for ready reference, Section 249-A of the Code (ibid) is hereby reproduced as under:
“[249-A. Power of Magistrate to acquit accused at any stage. Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, he considers that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence.]”
And for the cases triable by Court of Sessions under Chapter XXII-A of the Code (ibid), Court can acquit the accused at any stage of the case if after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for the reasons to be recorded, it considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence; Section 265-K of the Code (ibid) is also hereby reproduced below for ready reference:
“265-K. Power of Court to acquit accused at any stage. Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Court from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case, if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, it considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence.”
When language of Section 249-A is compared with the language of Section 265-K of the Code (ibid), then it becomes crystal clear that Magistrate can acquit the accused at any stage of the case under Section 249-A ,Cr.P.C. if he considers that the charge is groundless or there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence whereas under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C., Court can acquit the accused at any stage of the case only if he considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence and the reason for acquittal that charge is groundless, is not included in the same.
It is quite understandable that legislature in its wisdom gave power under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. to the Magistrate to acquit the accused at any stage of the case if charge is groundless or there is no probability of conviction for the reason that punishments for the offences triable by the Court of Magistrates are lesser as compared to the punishments provided for the offences triable by the Court of Sessions, therefore, if Magistrate comes to the conclusion that on the basis of material/evidence available on the record, charge is groundless, he can acquit the accused under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. and furthermore, if he finds that such material has come on the record that now there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence, he can also acquit the accused under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. whereas since offences triable by the Court of Sessions are of heinous/ serious nature entailing heavy punishments, therefore, acquittal of the accused on the basis of charge is groundless is not provided in Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. and prosecution is to be afforded full and complete opportunity to produce evidence for proving the case and in this regard, Subsection (2) of Section 265-F, Cr.P.C. can also be safely referred, according to which, Court shall ascertain from the Public Prosecutor or, as the case may be from the complainant, the names of any persons likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case and to be able to give evidence for the prosecution, and shall summon such persons to give evidence before it; for ready reference, Subsection (2) of Section 265-F, Cr.P.C. is hereby reproduced below:
“265-F…….. (2) The Court shall ascertain from the Public Prosecutor or, as the case may be, from the complainant, the names of any persons likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case and to be able to give evidence for the prosecution, and shall summon such persons to give evidence before it.”
However, if Court finds that there is no probability of conviction of the accused of any offence only then, he can be acquitted at any stage of the case under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. i.e. if evidence/material of such nature has come on the record that further evidence of any nature/kind whatsoever cannot result into conviction of the accused, then he can be acquitted under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C.
Nutshell in simple words at the cost of repetition is that under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. if the material/evidence available on the record makes the charge groundless, accused can be acquitted and similarly, such sort of material/evidence if comes on the record, which has made the conviction impossible, even then accused can be acquitted under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. whereas under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C., accused can be acquitted at any stage of the case by the Court of Sessions if such sort of material/evidence comes on the record, which makes the conviction impossible and any further evidence cannot change the result.
Since in this case charge has been framed as per material available on the record, Muhammad Bilal, HC/Moharrar has been produced as PW-1 whose examination-in-chief has been recorded however cross-examination over him has been reserved on behalf of the accused persons and any evidence is not available on the record till now to show that there is no probability of conviction of the accused/ appellant of any offence, therefore, in such circumstances, there is no occasion for exercising power under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. and throttling the case of prosecution at its infancy i.e. initial stage. Furthermore, it is clarified that for invoking power under Section
265-K, Cr.P.C., material/evidence available is not only relevant but material/evidence, which can be produced, and if produced, can cause conviction of the accused of any offence, is also to be considered.
7. In view of what has been discussed above, it has been noticed that impugned order has been passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Faisalabad/trial Court while keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as well as relevant law on the subject, therefore, same needs no interference by this Court. Hence, instant appeal is without merits and is hereby dismissed in limine.
(A.A.K.) Appeal dismissed

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